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Abstract 
Innovation is development of new ideas that leads to better solutions to current problems. 
From an economic standpoint, innovation is the engine of economic growth. The appearance of 
innovation is not uniform in the market, and neither are its affects. The development of new 
products and technology is significant in any industry. As a result, understanding the path of 
progress within an industry is necessary to maximize the benefit from innovation. The focus of 
this research is to further understand the relationship between producers, consumers, and the 
environment, in the context of innovation. Three scenarios are evaluated. 
 First, innovation evaluated in the context technology intensive industries with product 
differentiation. Using an optimal control approach with product differentiation and firm outlook 
we examine conditions that maximize social welfare. When firm(s) have the same discount rate 
regardless of market structure, a monopoly will develop more innovative products. However, it is 
shown that competition may increase innovation if firms alter their outlook in a duopoly market 
structure. 
Next, influence of consumers on producer adoption of clean technology is evaluated. A 
spatial model is developed to analyze welfare implications of environmental policies in a 
competitive market with production and consumption heterogeneity. Consumers with 
heterogeneous preferences choose between non-green and certified green products, while firms 
with heterogeneous production costs decide whether to engage in green production.  In order for 
green products to be recognized by consumers, firms must join a green club.  The number of green 
firms, environmental standard, and overall welfare under the market solution are all found to be 
socially sub-optimal.   
  
Finally, producer innovation in markets characterized by public policy due to emission 
concerns is evaluated. Using a dynamic approach, we derive a firm’s optimal R&D investment 
strategy to develop clean technology.  Explicitly allowing for the cumulative nature of R&D shows 
that emissions per unit of output are lowest when the firms cooperate in R&D, and show that a 
profit-maximizing merged entity will never choose the most efficient investment strategy in clean 
technology, which has implications for emission tax policy and environmental innovation to 
improve overall welfare.     
  
  
 
ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION: COMPETITION, CLUBS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
by 
 
 
JASON WALTER 
 
 
 
B.S., North Dakota State University, 2007 
M.S., North Dakota State University, 2010 
M.A., Kansas State University, 2013 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
College of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2015 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Major Professor 
Yang-Ming Chang 
  
Copyright 
JASON WALTER 
2015 
 
 
  
Abstract 
Innovation is development of new ideas that leads to better solutions to current problems. 
From an economic standpoint, innovation is the engine of economic growth. The appearance of 
innovation is not uniform in the market, and neither are its affects. The development of new 
products and technology is significant in any industry. As a result, understanding the path of 
progress within an industry is necessary to maximize the benefit from innovation. The focus of 
this research is to further understand the relationship between producers, consumers, and the 
environment, in the context of innovation. Three scenarios are evaluated. 
 First, innovation evaluated in the context technology intensive industries with product 
differentiation. Using an optimal control approach with product differentiation and firm outlook 
we examine conditions that maximize social welfare. When firm(s) have the same discount rate 
regardless of market structure, a monopoly will develop more innovative products. However, it is 
shown that competition may increase innovation if firms alter their outlook in a duopoly market 
structure. 
Next, influence of consumers on producer adoption of clean technology is evaluated. A 
spatial model is developed to analyze welfare implications of environmental policies in a 
competitive market with production and consumption heterogeneity. Consumers with 
heterogeneous preferences choose between non-green and certified green products, while firms 
with heterogeneous production costs decide whether to engage in green production.  In order for 
green products to be recognized by consumers, firms must join a green club.  The number of green 
firms, environmental standard, and overall welfare under the market solution are all found to be 
socially sub-optimal.   
  
Finally, producer innovation in markets characterized by public policy due to emission 
concerns is evaluated. Using a dynamic approach, we derive a firm’s optimal R&D investment 
strategy to develop clean technology.  Explicitly allowing for the cumulative nature of R&D shows 
that emissions per unit of output are lowest when the firms cooperate in R&D, and show that a 
profit-maximizing merged entity will never choose the most efficient investment strategy in clean 
technology, which has implications for emission tax policy and environmental innovation to 
improve overall welfare.     
viii 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xii 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xiii 
Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... xv 
Chapter 1 - Strategic Investment and Innovation of Products ........................................................ 1 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Model ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
2.1 Innovation and Appeal ...................................................................................................... 5 
2.2 Firm Profits ....................................................................................................................... 6 
2.3 Demand and User Utility .................................................................................................. 7 
3. Monopoly Development ......................................................................................................... 9 
3.1 Hamiltonian & Monopolists’ Dynamic System .............................................................. 10 
3.2 Monopoly Steady State Analysis .................................................................................... 12 
3.3 Comparative Dynamics ................................................................................................... 13 
4. Duopoly Development .......................................................................................................... 14 
4.1 Hamiltonian & Duopolists’ Dynamic System ................................................................ 16 
4.2 Duopoly Steady State Analysis ....................................................................................... 18 
4.3 Comparative Dynamics ................................................................................................... 19 
5. Comparative Analysis ........................................................................................................... 20 
5.1 Uniform Outlook ............................................................................................................. 21 
5.2 Progressive and Myopic Outlooks .................................................................................. 23 
5.3 Industry Suspects ............................................................................................................ 27 
6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 29 
Chapter 2 - Green Product Certification, Heterogeneous Firms,  and Green Consumers ............ 32 
1.  Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 32 
2. The Analytical Framework ................................................................................................... 36 
2.1 Heterogeneous Consumers .............................................................................................. 36 
2.2 Heterogeneous Firms ...................................................................................................... 37 
2.3 Market Solution with a Green Club ................................................................................ 39 
ix 
 
3. Evaluating the Market Solution from the Social Welfare Perspective ................................. 43 
3.1 Social Welfare in the Market Solution ............................................................................ 44 
3.2 Optimal Welfare in the Social Planner’s Solution .......................................................... 47 
3.3 Comparison ..................................................................................................................... 49 
4. Welfare Implications of a Single-Tool Environmental Policy ............................................. 50 
4.1 Green Production with Abatement Subsidies ................................................................. 51 
4.2 Green Production with Membership Subsidies/Taxes .................................................... 53 
5. Welfare Implications of a Double-Tool Environmental Policy ............................................ 55 
5.1 A Double-Tool Approach ............................................................................................... 56 
5.2 Social Planner’s Solution with Dual Policy .................................................................... 57 
6. Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................. 59 
Chapter 3 - R&D Investment in Clean Technology...................................................................... 61 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 61 
2. Modeling Emissions & Clean Technology Innovation ......................................................... 64 
2.1 Dynamic R&D Optimization: Problems of Duopolistic Firms ....................................... 65 
2.2 Dynamic Game of Firms under Duopoly ........................................................................ 67 
2.3 Dynamic R&D Optimization: Problem of a Monopoly .................................................. 68 
2.4 Emission Taxes ............................................................................................................... 72 
3. Steady-State Equilibrium Analyses of Three R&D Regimes ............................................... 74 
3.1 Optimization Problems ................................................................................................... 74 
3.2 Steady-State Values ........................................................................................................ 76 
4. Comparing Alternative R&D Regimes ................................................................................. 77 
4.1 Emissions & Environmental Damage ............................................................................. 78 
4.2 Consumer Surplus ........................................................................................................... 80 
4.3 Firm Profits ..................................................................................................................... 81 
4.4 Social Welfare ................................................................................................................. 82 
5. Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................. 86 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 89 
Appendix A - Proof of Proposition 1 ............................................................................................ 95 
Appendix B - Comparative Dynamics (Monopoly)...................................................................... 96 
Appendix C - Proof of Proposition 3 ............................................................................................ 97 
x 
 
Appendix D - Comparative Dynamics (Duopoly) ........................................................................ 98 
Appendix E - Comparison of Product Appeal .............................................................................. 99 
Appendix F - Welfare Calculations ............................................................................................ 100 
 
xi 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Phase-plane diagram showing optimal R&D investment path ....................................... 70 
Figure 2 Effects of taxes on the steady-state equilibrium levels of emissions ............................. 73 
Figure 3 Market benefits under alternative R&D regimes ............................................................ 84 
 
xii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Payoff Matrix ................................................................................................................ 26 
 
xiii 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the entire Department of Economics at Kansas State University, for 
taking a chance on me when others wouldn’t. Without the department, my dream of getting a Ph.D 
would have ended before it started. Thanks to my fellow students: Jason Fewell, Laura Wright, 
Tyson Thomas, Jules Yimga, Nick Colsch, Akbar Ahmed, Bebonchu Atems, Mark Melichar, Ben 
Le, Vladimir Bejan and many others.  You made my journey more interesting and enjoyable. 
I would also like to thank all the faculty that helped me along the way. I appreciate Dr. 
Philip Gayle, Dr. Leilei Shen, and Dr. Mark Linville serving as members of my committee. I would 
also like to thank Professor Kuester and Professor Turner, your comments and suggestions 
improved my teaching skills greatly. While I still have much to learn, I know my potential has 
increased due to your guidance.  
While great teachers are hard to find, I was lucky enough to take multiple classes from two 
of the greatest professors I’ve ever met. Professor Chang’s enthusiasm in the classroom is truly 
contagious, and his approach made any topic interesting. While Professor Peterson’s clarity in the 
classroom made even the most complex topics easy to understand (and enjoyable). I truly believe 
if anybody could teach me if there is a relationship between fractal and quantum theory of 
spacetime, it would be him.  The amount of time Professor Peterson would spend helping with 
projects outside of his class (on topics outside his normal research) is astounding. I appreciate the 
time, effort, and interest he took in our research. His contributions significantly improved my 
research, and also my skills. 
It is rare to meet someone who is consistently encouraging and positive; it even rarer to 
have them as an adviser. I can’t express accurately the effect my amazing adviser Professor Yang-
Ming Chang has had on my life and career. You always treated me with respect, and valued my 
xiv 
 
ideas. Even when I made mistakes, you were there, not to criticize, but to help me correct and learn 
from them. Your encouragement made research not only enjoyable and fun, but also rewarding. 
The skills you have taught me, will be useful for the rest of my life. Thank you, Professor Chang. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my wife. You helped me every single day, sometimes with 
little things: making sure I had something to eat (you might have been too good at this one) and 
had time to study, to the more noticeable things like correcting my papers and emergency 
transportation when I am late to a final exam. The additional responsibilities (too numerous to 
name here) you endured, are why I was able to be successful.  
xv 
 
Dedication 
To all the women in my family. To my three wonderful daughters, Faith, KayLynn and 
Konstance, you made me take breaks from my work (frequently it was involuntarily) and were the 
best motivation to complete my education. To my mother, DeEtte, you always believed I could do 
anything, even when I didn’t think I could (your editing on hundreds of pages of my writing helped 
too). And most importantly to my wonderful wife, Ellyssa, you put your life on hold, so that I 
could successfully pursue my dreams. This was only possible because of your support.   
1 
 
Chapter 1 - Strategic Investment and Innovation of Products 
 1. Introduction 
Understanding the role of innovation in the face of competition is fundamental to 
identifying an industry’s progression. The ways that competition affects the incentives to innovate 
is fundamental to understanding not only specific markets, but also overall economic growth. 
Innovation leads to the creation new products that can yield greater demand and utility, providing 
a method for firms to increase profit and market share. In order to survive in a competitive industry, 
innovation becomes “a life or death matter for the firm” (Baumol 2002, pg.1).  
These questions have been long debated in the economic literature. Dating as far back as 
Schumpeter (1943), the role of competition and firm size relative to innovation has been discussed. 
Understanding the importance of strategic and monopolistic positions to enhance innovation, 
Schumpeter noted that a perfectly competitive market “is in a less favorable position to evolve” 
(Schumpeter 1934, pg. 106). A counterargument by Arrow (1962) is that monopolists gain little 
advantage from innovation, so that incentives for innovation are highest in a competitive market. 
Since the seminal works by Arrow and Schumpeter, a myriad of studies have compared 
both product and process innovation with varying degrees of competition. Berry and Waldfogel 
(2010) analyze the relationship between product quality and market size, and show how the 
structure of costs is an important aspect in determining the quality that persists in a market. Aghion 
et al. (2014) focus on the relationship between competition and innovation. Using patents and the 
Lerner index, they show that an inverted-U relationship is present, with the highest levels of 
innovation at an intermediate level of industry concentration.  
Others have added new properties and structure to understand the incentive to innovate 
further.  Gans and Stern (2004) examine the actions of incumbent/entrants when technology can 
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be licensed.  Bandyopadhyay and Acharyya (2004) examine the effects of consumer heterogeneity 
(high-end vs. low-end) on the complementary effects of product and process innovation. Their 
analysis shows that the prevalence of high-end users increases a firm’s gains from product 
innovation. Chen and Schwartz (2013) incorporate consumers’ heterogeneity by using the 
traditional Hotelling line to represent location in preference space, which increases a monopolist’s 
gain from innovation. 
 While the majority of innovation literature has used a static approach, much of the 
contemporary analysis has employed a dynamic setting. Nocke (2007) evaluates R&D and product 
innovation under collusion. Cellini and Lamberini (2009) compare competition and cooperation 
of duopolies. Walter and Chang (2014) use a similar approach and apply it to clean technology, 
but include the monopoly outcome. Ouardighi et al. (2013) study R&D stock with spillovers. These 
approaches allow for temporal analysis with a cumulative building of knowledge, which more 
closely represents the R&D process. The work by Arrow and Schumpeter has also been re-
evaluated by Cellini and Lamberini (2011).  In a dynamic setting, they evaluated the relationship 
between R&D intensity and market structure in the presence of spillovers. Their results show that 
R&D investment increases with the number of firms, thus contradicting previous findings obtained 
from static analysis. 
 The distinction between product innovation (creating new goods) and process innovation 
(reducing production costs) is also important.  In the majority of studies, process innovation is the 
focus (such as Arrow 1962, Cellini and Lambertini 2011) and is represented by decreasing 
marginal cost. In the case of product innovation, oftentimes the development of a new good is 
represented by either product differentiation (Lambertini and Mantovani 2010; Belleflamme and 
Vergart 2011) or a quality measure (Bandyopadhyay and Acharyya 2004; Chen and Schwartz 
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2013; Saha 2014). While these approaches provide useful insights about product innovation, they 
may not represent some industries accurately.  With product differentiation, the structure 
inherently assumes that innovation diminishes the level of competition between products, whereas 
a quality measure assumes a maximum level of development (which usually is exogenous 
provided).  
This paper develops a dynamic model of R&D, building on the approach of Cellini and 
Lambertini (2009), in which innovation is the result of an accumulation of knowledge. In addition, 
we expand on types of innovation that occurs in a market and provide additional insights into the 
competition/innovation debate. In particular, we divide innovation into three distinct types: appeal, 
differentiation, and process. While all three types of innovation are a result of R&D, each has a 
different effect in a market. Innovation can make a product: better (appeal)1 thereby changing the 
utility users receive from the product, or have different uses (differentiation)2 thereby changing its 
substitutability and target market, or finally, cheaper to produce (process)3. This distinction is 
necessary because both appeal and product differentiation affects the demand for a good, while 
process innovation affects the firms’ costs and therefore supply.  If there are two products and one 
has higher appeal, every consumer will strictly prefer it, ceteris paribus. With differentiated 
products having similar appeal, on the other hand, a subset of consumers will strictly prefer one of 
the products available.  
Our results provide new perspectives on the Arrow-Schumpeter debate. We show that a 
monopoly will obtain a higher level of innovation as measured by steady state product appeal, but 
                                                 
1 Appeal defines the usefulness of a product. Examples of this are new features or being more ergonomic. 
2 Differentiation defines the substitutability of products. Examples are product’s functionality or style of a specific 
subset of consumers. This could include quality, since a consumer preference depends on income (this possibility is 
omitted, as will be discussed). In our opinion, quality should be treated differently than innovation. One measure of 
quality is a products’ longevity which is a property of the products inputs.  
3 Process innovation is treated the same as in the literature, decreasing the production costs of a product. 
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that the innovation advantage does not necessarily imply higher consumer or total surplus. Hence, 
there may be a tradeoff between innovation and welfare. Moreover, we show that the innovation 
advantage of monopolies may not hold if the level of industry competition affects the discount rate 
driving the firm’s outlook decisions. In particular, if a monopolist tends to behave more myopically 
(make decisions consistent with a higher discount rate) then the resulting level of innovation will 
be lower than a duopolist’s. We provide a justification for myopic behavior for monopolies, and 
show that duopoly firms have an incentive to make decisions based on a relatively lower discount 
rate. In addition, we provide condition under which it is possible for an entire industry to behave 
myopically. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic structure of our model, 
while sections 3 and 4 provide the monopoly and duopoly derivations. We compare the results of 
each market structure in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 2. Model 
In this paper, we incorporate all three types of innovation, but focus directly on appeal.4 
Consumers’ utility function incorporates both the level of product differentiation and appeal. 
Horizontal product differentiation is represented by heterogeneous consumer preferences (similar 
to Chen and Schwartz 2013), which allows us to simultaneously incorporate a product’s appeal 
into a firm’s innovation decision. This approach also allows us to compare and measure product 
appeal.  Finally, we indirectly integrate process innovation into the firm’s production function.  
To begin, we start with the supply of a good with initial appeal Ao, which represents the 
basic or fundamental product introduced into the marketplace. Firms are then able to improve the 
                                                 
4 The firm can only invest in appeal innovation, while process and differentiation are accounted for indirectly. All 
three types of innovation could be included independently, but it is cumbersome, and is left for future study. 
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product by investing in R&D. Firms R&D can increase their product’s appeal through innovation 
to make the product better and more valuable. Each new investment in R&D builds upon the 
previous work. At the same time, consumers become accustomed to new features (or the features 
become obsolete), so that the value of a product will eventually decay back to the initial appeal if 
the firm does not introduce new features into their product. These properties imply that product 
appeal evolves over time depending on the trajectory of investment and the rate at which features 
become obsolete. 
 2.1 Innovation and Appeal 
 We define the equation of motion for product appeal as: 
  ?̇? , , ,i t V Ai t i t                    (1) 
where Ai,t represents additional appeal of firm i’s products due to innovation (in time period t), Vi,t 
represents investment in product appeal (or similarly R&D),  γ represents the effectiveness of 
investment on product development, and δ represents the rate of obsolescence. 
As time passes, two effects are concurrently operating in equation (1). First, as firms invest 
in their product, the overall appeal improves. The second effect allows new features to decrease in 
novelty to the point of eventually becoming obsolete. Our representation does not imply removal 
of obsolete features from future products, but instead allows features to become a fundamental part 
of the good or characteristic of which is improved upon.5  
Similar to Arrow (1962); Ouardighi (2013); and Chen and Schwartz (2013), we assume 
that innovation is “perfectly patentable” (or R&D is fully appropriated). Therefore, the equation 
                                                 
5 Some examples are: low resolution cameras for cell phones, Wi-Fi for laptops, touch screens, or ESC (electronic 
stability control, although in some countries this was compulsory. 
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of motion is dependent on the firm’s investment only, and void of any spillover effects.6 This may 
seem like a limiting assumption, but here we define products as having a firm-specific style and 
design. Consumers’ heterogeneity implies that some individuals have a preference for one firm’s 
distinct design features, so that the firm would erode their brand distinction by copying a rival’s 
product.  
 2.2 Firm Profits 
Taking from the R&D literature, we model investment in appeal (Vi) as quadratic in cost.  
Therefore, each time period the firm’s profits are: 
2 2
, , , , ,x P cA Vi t i t i t i t i t   
               (2) 
where c is a scaling parameter on the fixed cost of production and β is a scaling parameter on 
investment costs. Note that the structure of fixed cost along with the obsolescence term ( ,Ai t ) 
in equation (1) represent process innovation in our model.  Obsolescence can be treated as an 
indicator of process innovation because firms inevitably learn how to produce new features more 
efficiently as they become more commonplace.  Equation (1) implies that if investments in new 
product features are small relative to the rate of obsolescence, Ai  will fall and equation (2) implies 
that the fixed cost of production will fall as well.  
Similar to Berry and Waldfogel (2010) we assume fixed costs are increasing in appeal.7 
This is appropriate because, unlike quality, more appealing products require new production 
methods. For convenience, we set the marginal cost of producing the good equal to zero, as we 
assume improvements in appeal are not caused by better or more expensive inputs.  While 
                                                 
6 The absence of spillovers means the closed-loop solutions will collapse into the open-loop solution.  
7 Note that Berry and Waldfogel (2010) discuss product quality not appeal. Our assumption is still appropriate since 
we are not concerned with the quality of inputs. 
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assuming “better” products do not have higher marginal cost may not be appropriate for some 
industries, inclusion of this property would yield little benefit for our purposes.   
Our model structure captures several previously identified properties in the process and 
product innovation literature. Specifically, it precisely matches both the “early” and “growth” 
product life cycle, which represent two of the three stages outlined by Abernathy and Utterback 
(1978).8 During the first two stages, the production cost of new product innovation outpaces cost 
reduction from process innovation.  A case could also be made that our approach represents the 
“mature” stage as well, which Bayus (1995) characterizes as the period when “only small 
improvements in product and process are undertaken.”9  
 2.3 Demand and User Utility 
As is common in the optimal control literature, we assume that a new cohort of consumers 
enters the market each time period. Each consumer purchases no more than one good. Similar to 
Chen and Schwartz (2004), demand for the product(s) is derived from a cohort of uniformly 
distributed heterogeneous consumers. However, our approach differs in that we focus on each 
firm’s product innovation in the context of horizontal product differentiation.  
In order to identify the demand for each firm’s product, we need to derive the consumer 
demand from their utility. If two firms provide the product (not necessarily with the same appeal), 
                                                 
8 First, in the early stage of development, the degree of process innovation occurring is smaller, due to the size of Ai,t. 
The incentive to invest in product innovation is relatively large because the amount of obsolescence is small when 
compared to new investments (γVi,t >>δAi,t), representing the early stage. However, as product innovation occurs, Ai,t 
increases from investment, the incentive to develop the product erodes (δAi,t increases and approaches γVi,t), 
representing the growth stage. At the same time, the degree of process innovation is increasing as Ai,t increases. This 
means that product innovation is initially large, but continually decreases. Process innovation, on the other hand, is 
initially small, but continues to grow. 
9 We will show that, in the steady state, appeal and therefore costs remain constant, which shows that improvements 
cease. In addition, if a firm stopped investing in their product, once their appeal has reached its apex, process 
innovation would begin diminishing. This could also represent the “mature” stage since process innovation would 
outpace product innovation. Our focus is on product innovation, but if we continued our analysis beyond the point of 
product innovation, our representation of process innovation would match the bell shaped described by Utterback and 
Abernathy (1975). 
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then each firm’s innovation or product improvements increases the demand and the associated 
utility derived from that firm’s product. We denote the increased utility by ϴAi, where the scaling 
parameter, ,  measures the increase in appeal or value to consumers from an increase in product 
development.  
To represent the consumers heterogeneity via product differentiation, consumers are 
located along a Hotelling line of distance one, with consumers preferring firm i (j) located closer 
to zero (one). This yields a utility function for an arbitrary consumer x (where x ∈ [0, 1]) as: 
                     if  good "i" is purchased,
(1 )           if  good "j" is purchased,
0                                                  if no good is purchased,
A A P xo i i
U A A P xx o j j
 
 
   
 
     





           (3) 
Where τ represents the standard measure of product differentiation, and Pi and Pj represent the 
prices for firm i and j’s product, respectively.  
 Several details about the utility function require additional comments. Similar to Berry and 
Waldfogel (2010), we intentionally omit consumer income effects. Including income effects would 
unnecessarily complicate the model and yield little, if any, benefit.10 It is possible to incorporate 
generic products, by representing other firms operating in the market providing a product with 
appeal Ao. While this may be a useful extension of the model depending on the market in question, 
for brevity we omit the discussion of this case.11  
In addition, the structure of the utility function facilitates several market outcomes. First, 
by removing either firm, we can represent innovation solely by a monopoly. Second, if users exist 
that refrain from purchasing either good, then the market is segmented and each firm will operate 
                                                 
10 Bonanno and Haworth (1998) provide a static analysis which includes both income and quality in the context of 
process and product innovation. They also include heterogeneity in the firm’s products (high and low). 
11 For a similar static version of this scenario, see Chen and Schwartz (2013). In our approach it amounts to setting Ao 
= Po = Co, where P1 = Po + markup. Our focus is innovation, so we simply assume existence of generic products. 
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as a monopolist.12 Lastly, if every consumer purchases a product, the firms will be in direct 
competition with one another. As is the custom with the Hotelling spatial approach, we identify 
the marginal consumer (denoted by xM for monopoly and x* for duopoly) in each market structure 
in order to identify the market size for each product. 
 3. Monopoly Development 
When firm i has no direct competitors, either because the firm is a monopolist or because 
the market is partially served, the marginal consumer (xi
M) is indifferent between purchasing firm 
i’s product and purchasing nothing. Setting 0,A A P xo i i      we can identify the marginal 
consumer as: 
 i
A A PoM i ix


 
                 (4) 
This implies that the market size for the monopolist is the interval [0, xi
M]. We obtain the revenue 
of the firm’s product, conditional on appeal in each period t, as 
, ,
, , ,
A A Po i t i tMx P Pi t i t i t


 

 
  
 
. 
 The firm faces a dynamic optimization problem in which ,Pi t  and ,Vi t  are control variables 
and Ai,t is a state variable, with (1) as the equation of motion. However, the optimal price in each 
period can be determined as a contemporaneous function of the other variables because it only 
affects the firm’s current revenue and neither impacts current costs nor the future values of the 
state variable (equations (1) and (2)).  The firm’s problem has a nested structure, in which price is 
the solution to a static revenue maximization problem each period, and the optimized revenue 
                                                 
12 Example of industries where product demand is segmented: In the early cell phone industry, the Motorola Razr was 
aimed at younger market relative to blackberry which was designed for professional use.  
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function becomes part of the dynamic optimization problem in which investment Vi,t is the sole 
control variable.  
The monopoly revenue (as a function of price) for product with appeal Ai,t is 
,
( )  [( ) / ]), , , ,,
M
Pi t
R P Max A A P Poi t i t i t i ti t     . The first-order condition for a maximum is, 
( 2 ) / 0,, ,A A Po i t i t    which implies a revenue-maximizing price of ( ) / 2, ,P A Aoi t i t 
.
 
Substituting this price into the objective function allows us to represent the firm’s revenue function 
as: 2(1/ 4 )( ), , ,( ) .
MR A A Aoi t i t i t     Therefore, firm’s revenue depends only on the dynamic 
investment choices, which are determined by the control problem: 
      
2
,
1 2 2 , , ,40Vi t
Max t
A A cA V e dto i t i t i t

 

   
      
 
       s.t.      ?̇? , , ,i t V Ai t i t              (5) 
where ρ represents the  firm’s discount rate on future profits. Equation (5) represents the 
monopolist’s discounted stream of profits.  
 3.1 Hamiltonian & Monopolists’ Dynamic System 
 From equation (5), we can derive the Hamiltonian13 for firm i as: 
    
21 2 2
4
H A A cA V V Ao i i i i i i    
                         (6) 
where λi is the co-state variable.  
 Next, we verify the sufficient condition for a constrained maximum.14 This requires that
4c  2, which seems very plausible, as it states that the shift in demand will be smaller than the 
                                                 
13 Note that the time subscript is suppressed for convenience. 
14 Taking the appropriate second order conditions, yields HVV =-2β<0 and 
2
( 2 2 )H cAA    , thus 
2
( 2 )( 2 2 ) (0)(0) 0H H H H cVV AA AV VA         , as long as  
2
4 ,c   Thus, the sufficient conditions are satisfied 
for a constrained maximum. The stability of the dynamic system is also provided in appendix A. 
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change in production costs for very appealing products. If we think about the contrapositive of this 
condition, it becomes obvious that the condition will be satisfied in all cases of interest. If the shift 
in appeal from product development is so substantial that it exceeds the additional cost of product, 
this implies that the firm’s product is so appealing that demand, and therefore profits, will become 
unbounded. For the remainder of our analysis, we assume this condition is satisfied.  
In order to identify the optimal investment strategy and the resulting steady state, the 
maximum principle conditions are calculated from equation (6). This yields the following 
conditions: 
2 0i i
H
V
Vi
 

  

             (7A) 
 ?̇? i
H
V Ai i
i
 


  

                        (7B) 
 ?̇?  1 2 4
2i
H
A A c Aoi i i iAi
    


      

         (7C) 
Rearranging (7A) yields the firm’s optimal investment function: 
 
2
iV i



                  (8) 
Observe that the firm’s optimal investment function depends on the co-state variable. 
Taking the derivative of best optimal investment function with respect to time yields: 
 ?̇?
2i


 ?̇? i                    (9) 
 Substituting equation (7C) and λi, derived from (8), into equation (9), yields the monopoly 
(denoted by “M”) firm’s investment path over time, which characterizes the dynamics of 
investment efforts for firm i. This can be written in terms of the state (appeal) and control 
(investment) as: 
12 
 
?̇?
  
 
2
4
4
c A AoiM
Vii
   
 

 
    ,           (10) 
which when combined with equation (7B), summarizes the dynamic movements of investment and 
appeal.  
We can observe in equation (10) that the initial appeal of the product negatively affects the 
level of investment, which implies that a monopolist will slow the development of better products. 
The slower development results in a larger stream of discounted profits. While these properties 
bring insight into the path of innovation, identifying the resulting level of investment is required 
to understand the consequences of the firm’s decisions. 
 3.2 Monopoly Steady State Analysis 
Setting equation (7B) and (10) equal to zero, we identify the dynamic system’s stationary 
conditions, which are characterized by the following Proposition: 
Proposition 1. As long as 24c   holds, the monopolist steady state point is: 
 
 
2
2 24 4
AM oAi c

       
 

  
; 
 2 24 4
AM oV
c

        
 

  
 
which is a unique saddle point. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
 In addition, we can use the steady state values to identify the firm’s steady state price and 
market size using equation (4), as: 
 
 
 
22
2 24 4
A coM
Pi c
    
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
          (11A) 
 
 
 
22
2 24 4
x
A coM
i c
   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
          (11B) 
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Substituting (11A) and (11B) into the firm’s profit function provided in equation (2), yields the 
firm’s steady state profit each period: 
 
   
 
22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 24 2 4
2
2 24 4
A c c coM
c
            

     
    
         
   
   
   
     

  
     (11C) 
Next, we measure the steady state market benefits. We define the consumer surplus (CS) and total 
surplus (TS) in the market as:   
 
0
x
CS U dxx              (12A) 
 TS CS               (12B)  
Evaluating equations (12A) and (12B) in the steady state using equations (11A), (11B), and (11C) 
we can calculate consumer surplus and total surplus in the monopoly steady state as: 
 
 
2
2 2 22
2
2 24 4
A coMCS
c
   
     
 
  
 
   
      
   
 

  
         (13A)  
 
   
 
2 22 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 36 12 6 12
2
2 2 24 4
A c c coMTS
c
                  
     
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
      

   
   (13B) 
The monopolist’s profit, consumer surplus, and total surplus (equations 11C, 13A, and 
13B) will be used to evaluate how welfare changes with the addition of another firm into the 
marketplace. 
 3.3 Comparative Dynamics 
Next, we evaluate the effects of product differentiation on the steady values for the firm’s 
investment, appeal, and price as well as the effects on consumer surplus, profit and total surplus. 
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This is accomplished by taking the derivatives of equations (11) and (13), with respect to τ.15 This 
allows us to state: 
Corollary 1. Higher levels of product differentiation cause the Monopolist’s steady state 
investment, appeal, price, profit, consumer surplus, and total surplus all to decrease.   
 As it becomes harder to attract consumers with disfavor for the monopolist’s product, the 
monopolist’s incentive to innovate erodes. This means that as a monopolist’s product becomes less 
appealing due to location or consumer preferences, it decreases the firm’s investment in the 
product.  
Next, we evaluate the effects of product’s initial appeal on the steady values for investment, 
appeal, price, and profit.16 This allows us to state: 
Corollary 2. For products with greater initial appeal, the Monopolist increases its steady 
state investment, appeal, and price, which result in greater profit, consumer surplus, and total 
surplus.   
 This result is a consequence of demand shifts caused by innovation. Not only do products 
with high initial demand allow the monopolist to charge a higher price, they also expand the market 
for the product. As a consequence, the monopolist has conditional resources to invest in R&D. The 
result is a higher level of both investment and product appeal in the monopoly market. 
 4. Duopoly Development 
In this section, we evaluate how product innovation occurs in a fully served market serviced 
by duopoly firms that both invest in product innovation.17 In a fully served market, the marginal 
                                                 
15 These are provided in Appendix B. 
16 These are provided in Appendix B. 
17 Note that in the case that the market is not fully-served, each firm will operate as a monopolist according to our 
findings in section 2. 
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consumer (x*) is indifferent between purchasing a product from either firm, therefore from 
equation (3), we have:  (1 ).A A P x A A P xo oi i j j            In order to identify firm i’s 
market size, we solve for x, which yields: 
   *
2
A A P Pi j j i
x
 

   
               (14A) 
Similarly, for firm j, we solve for (1- x), which yields: 
 
   *
1
2
A A P Pj i i j
x
 

   
                      (14B) 
We can represent the size of firm i’s market by the interval [0, x*], and firm j‘s is [x*, 1]. Notice 
that equations (14A) and (14B) are symmetrical, thus for brevity, in the following section we focus 
solely on firm i.  
As in the monopoly case, each duopolist faces a nested dynamic problem where revenue is 
determined each period conditional on the state of product appeal and the resulting revenue 
function becomes a component of the optimal control problem. In the duopoly case, however, the 
appeal of both firms are relevant state variables and the price obtained by each firm is the result of 
a Cournot price game played each period. Conditional on firm j’s price, Pj, and the observed states 
Ai and Aj, firm i’s best response function at each instant t, is the solution to the revenue 
maximization problem 
 
   , , , ,
,2,
A A P Pi t j t i t j t
Max Pi tPi t
 

 
 
  
 
   
 
The first order condition to this problem is (1 / 2 )( )2 0,, , , ,P P A Ai t j t i t j t         which implies a 
best response function of: ( )(1 / 2), , , ,P P A Ai t j t i t j t      .  Given a symmetric best response 
function for firm j, the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot price game for firm i is 
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( )(1 / 3), , ,P A Ai t i t j t     . Substituting this expression for Pi and the symmetric expression for 
firm j into the revenue function gives a reduced-form revenue function for firm i of 
* 2( )(1 / 18 ) 3 ., , ,R A Ai t i t j t       We can then write firm i’s optimal control problem in a fully 
served market as: 
   
21 2 2 3 , , , ,180,
Max t
A A cA V e dti t j t i t i tVi t

   

   
      
  
 
  Subject to: ?̇? , , ,i t V Ai t i t                             (15) 
As before, this represents the discounted stream of profits for the firm in the competitive setting.  
 4.1 Hamiltonian & Duopolists’ Dynamic System 
 From equation (15), we derive the current-value Hamiltonian for firm i as: 18 
 H =
1
18t
3t +qAi -qAj( )
2
-cAi
2 -bVi
2 +li gVi -dAi( )               (16) 
The Hamiltonian reveals that the sufficient condition for a constrained maximum are satisfied.19 
The maximum principle conditions derived from equation (16) are as follows: 
2 0
H
Vi i
Vi
 

  

           (17A) 
 ?̇? i
H
V Ai i
i
 


  

                      (17B) 
                                                 
18 The time subscript is again suppressed for convenience. 
19 As before, we take the appropriate second order conditions: 2 0HVV     and  
2
9 2H cAA    , using these, 
we obtain: 
2
( 2 )[( 9 ) (2 )] (0)(0) 0) / (H H H H cVV AA AV VA         , Therefore, as long as  
2
18 ,c   (which is 
satisfied based off the monopoly condition) the sufficient conditions are met for a constrained maximum. Note that 
firm j’s investment (Vj) and appeal (Aj) are exogenous to firm i. However, if symmetry is assumed, then
   2 2 0H H H HVV AA AV VA c     . The stability of the dynamic system is provided in appendix D. 
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 ?̇?  1 2 2 3 18
9i
H
A A c Ai i j i iAi
     


       

      (17C) 
Using equation (17A), we can identify the firm’s optimal investment function as:20 
 
2
Vi i



                (18) 
Taking the derivative of optimal investment function from equation (18) with respect to 
time yields: 
 ?̇?
2i


 ?̇? i                  (19) 
Note that the duopolist’s investment function appears to be identical to the monopolist. 
However, the co-state variable, representing the shadow price of an additional unit of appeal, 
differs in the two cases. To facilitate our comparison between different market structures, we 
impose a symmetry condition on firms in the duopoly setting (and we denote the results with 
“*”).21 Imposing symmetry on equation (17C), we substitute it and the co-state variable in (18) 
into (19). As before, we can identify the firm’s investment strategy, which yields: 
?̇?    * 6
6i
cA Vi i

  

                      (20) 
Using equation (20) and (17B), we can summarize the dynamic movements of investment and 
appeal when symmetrical duopolists serve the market. Specifically, we observe that the duopolist’s 
investment function shows a slightly different response when compared to the monopolist. The 
duopolists are unconcerned with the level of differentiation or initial product appeal, which is 
appropriate due to competition.  
                                                 
20 Note that 
*
0,
V jHi
V Aj i

  thus implying the absence of any feedback effect and that our results are time consistent. 
21 One extension of our analysis is to evaluate asymmetric firms, thus allowing an examination of incumbent and 
entrant actions similar to Gans and Stern (2004), however, we leave this for future study.  
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The optimal investment path now must account for rival products, with the result that both 
firms focus on maintaining pace with one another as opposed to solely focusing on profits. This 
makes intuitive sense, as inefficient or sub-optimal investment strategies result in a loss of market 
share, and therefore profit in the duopoly setting. 
 4.2 Duopoly Steady State Analysis 
As before, we can solve for the stationary conditions by setting equation (17B) and (20) 
equal to zero, which allows us to state the following: 
Proposition 2. The duopolist steady state point in a fully served market under symmetry is: 
 
 
2*
26 6
Ai c

   

 
  
 
*
26 6
Vi
c

   

 
   
which is a unique saddle point. 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 One important observation from the duopoly steady state result, which is similar to the 
dynamical system, is the absence of the initial appeal and product differentiation.  While the 
omission of product differentiation is expected due to the firms being symmetrical, the absence of 
initial appeal implies that development reaches the same steady state independently of the original 
product. This is a symptom of competition. In order to maintain market share, a firm’s product 
appeal must “keep up” with their competitor’s. Both firms are no longer focused solely on 
maximizing the profit stream; but must incorporate product improvements that occur in the market.   
 Next, we identify the firms’ steady state price and market size by imposing symmetry on 
equations (14A) and (14B). This yields: 
*P               (21A) 
1*
2
x               (21B) 
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Substituting these results into the firm’s profit function yields the firm’s steady state profit: 
 
 
2 2 2 2
*
22 2 2
36
c
c
   

  

 

          (21C) 
Next, we measure the steady state market benefits. We define the consumer surplus (CS) and total 
surplus (TS) in the duopoly market as:   
 
1
0 1
x
CS U dx U dxx x
x
  

           (22A) 
 2TS CS               (22B)  
Evaluating equation (22A) and (22B) in the steady state using equations (21A), (21B), and (21C) 
we can calculate consumer surplus and total surplus in the duopoly steady state as: 
2 24 5*
2 2228
AoCS
c
  
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 
 
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 
 
         (23B) 
 The next section compares duopoly’s profit, consumer surplus, and total surplus (equations 
21C, 23A, and 23B) to the monopoly result in order to ascertain the effects of competition. 
 4.3 Comparative Dynamics 
As in the previous section, we evaluate the effects of product differentiation on the steady-
state values for the firm’s on consumer surplus, profit and total surplus. Note that product 
differentiation (𝜏) is absent from the steady-state appeal and investment expressions in both cases. 
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Evaluating the effects of product differentiation on equation (21) and (23), allows us to state the 
following22: 
Corollary 3. Higher levels of product differentiation increases the Duopolists’ steady state 
price and profit, while decreasing consumer surplus. However, the net effect is an increase in total 
surplus.   
Although product differentiation is omitted from investment and appeal results, the firm 
recognizes greater product differentiation allows them to increase prices. The firm ignores product 
differentiation in their innovation decision, but exploits consumers’ heterogeneous preferences to 
increase revenue. This means that greater product differentiation does not directly affect the firm’s 
investment decision. Instead, greater product differentiation facilitates higher prices and by 
extension profit, thus providing resources for investment. 
 The product’s initial appeal is not only absent from investment and appeal, but also pricing 
and profit. This means the firm ignores the products initial value for both the pricing and 
investment decision. Ultimately, the products’ initial quality enters only into the consumer 
preferences; therefore, it (positively) affects only consumer surplus and total surplus. 
 5. Comparative Analysis 
 Using the results from section 3 and 4, we compare the duopoly and monopoly outcomes 
to determine the effects of competition on firms’ decisions and welfare. We compare both market 
constructs in two distinct ways. In the first section, we assume that a firm’s outlook is unaffected 
by the presence of a rival firm. The second section evaluates how outlook (as measured by the 
discount rate) affects a firm, and shows whether the presence of another firm can change a firm’s 
                                                 
22 The appendix D contains the necessary calculations. 
21 
 
outlook. 23 Finally, in the spirit of Teece (1992) we examine potential cooperative actions within 
an industry. 
In order to complete a relevant analysis, we assume that a monopoly in operation will 
service at least half the market. This condition is necessary to evaluate the effects of competition. 
In the scenario where a monopolist’s market size is less than half, the introduction of a rival does 
not impact the monopolists operation.24 Obviously in that scenario, the introduction of another 
firm increases consumer surplus and total surplus, while innovation, investment, and pricing of the 
incumbent firm is unaffected. The introduction of a “rival” unambiguously increases total welfare 
because new consumers are served, but not because it affects the incumbent monopolist or its 
consumers.  
 5.1 Uniform Outlook 
 In this section, we determine if the monopoly or duopoly market yields the highest: product 
appeal, consumer surplus, and total surplus. Our goal is not to determine the amount of investment, 
but evaluate which market has the highest level of innovation. This means that we treat innovation 
purely as a magnitude and ignore the level of product differentiation. We use this approach in order 
to identify the market that results in the best product. 
 We begin by examining the level of innovation that occurs in each market, and compare 
the steady state results from each scenario. For a duopoly to have a higher level of innovation, it 
means that MA A  , or that: 
                                                 
23 We differentiated a “myopic” firm from “forward-looking” firm by comparing their respective discount factor (ρ). 
Myopic (forward-looking) firms are those firms who put a large (small) discount on future profit, which is represented 
with a relatively large (small) ρ.  
24 The monopolist will serve at least half of the market if     2 2 24 4 0c A Ao o             . 
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           (24) 
From this comparison, we can determine the market structure that maximizes innovation. Since 
this condition never holds, we can formally state: 
Proposition 3. The level of innovation will always be greater in a monopoly relative to a duopoly, 
ceteris paribus. 
Proof: See Appendix E. 
 Our result is similar to the static findings by Chen and Schwartz (2013), who concluded 
that competition does not increase the level of innovation in a market. These results clearly contrast 
the findings of Arrow. Interestingly, our results also contradict the previous finding of Cellini and 
Lambertini (2011) who used a dynamic R&D approach. However, their focus on process 
innovation and the inclusion of spillover effects could be responsible.25 Another potential cause 
could be the market structure itself. As noted by Bonanno and Haworth (1998), Bertrand and 
Cournot competition lead to different innovation incentives. 
Our model reveals that a monopolist will always be able to extract a higher profit, 
generating additional resources to fund research. However, the use of an optimal control approach 
provides additional details about why monopolists have a higher level of innovation. Specifically, 
our approach shows that the monopolist’s path of investment differs depending on the product, as 
shown by the inclusion of the initial product’s quality in the firm’s decision. This does not occur 
                                                 
25 Walter and Chang 2014 may provide some insights as to the cause. They evaluate duopoly with both research 
competition and cooperation, and then compare both settings to the monopoly case (although they are discussing clean 
technology). They find that cooperation yields the most “innovation,” while competition yields the least, and 
monopoly in the middle. If we consider the cooperative and competitive duopoly case as the bounds on spillover, it 
shows that depending on the level of spillover, the duopoly case could exceed the monopoly case.  
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in the duopoly setting, where firms must focus on maintaining market share by developing fast 
enough to keep up with rivals. 
 5.2 Progressive and Myopic Outlooks 
 In this section, we evaluate conditions that may change a firm’s outlook and, therefore, the 
market outcome.  As shown by Fiat et al. (2014), a myopic vs. non-myopic (i.e. progressive) 
outlook yields different equilibrium. We first examine whether conditions exist for a duopoly to 
exceed a monopolist’s innovations. If such a scenario is present, it would reinforce the results of 
Arrow (1962) and the dynamic results of Celini and Lambertini (2011), but provide alternative 
reason for the result. This would also contradict the recent results of Chen and Schwartz (2013) 
and Teece (1992). 
 To begin, we postulate that profitability disincentivizes a firm from being progressive. In 
a duopoly setting, myopic behavior could be disastrous when rivaling a progressive firm. However, 
if barriers to entry are high, a monopoly firm can maintain both profit and market share, thus 
incentivizing myopic behavior. Therefore, we assume the rate of discount may change between 
market structures. We denote the monopolist’s discount rate as ρm and the duopolist’s discount rate 
as ρf. 
Setting the duopolist’s appeal to be greater than the monopolist’s, or MA A  , we see that 
in order for this to occur the following condition must hold:  
 
   2 2 2 23 6 6 4 4
2 4
A A c A co o of
m
      

 
   
            (25) 
Note that the discount rate (ρ) must lie in the interval [0, ∞]. Therefore, the condition outlined in 
equation (25) is plausible. This allows us to state: 
Proposition 4. If a monopolist is myopic relative to firms in a duopoly market as to satisfy the 
condition in (28), then duopoly innovation will exceed that of the monopolist. 
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Our result shows that even though a monopoly has the greatest potential for innovation, 
myopic behavior may result in innovation below the potential level.  The idea that firms may 
behave myopically is not new in the literature. Holmstrom (1989) notes, “Larger firms are at a 
comparative disadvantage in conducting highly innovative research…” and attributed this to the 
firm having to manage a “heterogeneous set of tasks.” This may loosely apply to our scenario, as 
the monopolist’s level of production will always exceed that of a duopolist. Another reason, as 
conjectured by Stein (1989), is that short-term stock pricing might incentivize myopic behavior.     
While both explanations for myopia could apply to a monopoly, Stein’s explanation may 
not be as relevant to our scenario (duopoly firms should have the same incentive). Regardless, we 
provide an alternative explanation.  Myopic strategies are reactive and favor the status quo, making 
them easier for firms to execute. Therefore, a profitable monopoly has an incentive to behave 
myopically. Obviously, there are limitations as to how myopic a firm can act even as a monopoly, 
but the absence of a rival clearly disincentives progressive behavior if it creates any hardship for 
a firm. Furthermore, it may be hard to detect a myopic behavior, since the firm still captures 
monopoly profits. 
Do these results imply that duopolies or even oligopolies will not behave myopically, or 
does Stein (1989) apply to duopolists as well? If only one firm behaves myopically in a competitive 
market, the consequences are more obvious. A progressive firm will invest more in its product, 
relative to a myopic one. Eventually, the progressive firm will create a better product and will 
capture a greater market share, while the myopic firm is pushed out of the market. But what if 
incentive exists for both firms to behave myopically? We seek to identify the conditions under 
which oligopoly firms may also have an incentive to behave myopically.  
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To identify the effects of a firm’s outlook, we take the derivative with respect to the 
discount rate of firm’s profit (from equation 11C) and appeal, which yields: 
 
 
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If we assume that the industry is one with high fixed costs and low technological decay (such that 
2 2c  > 0), then both firms’ profits unambiguously increase, while their appeal decreases. If 
we assume this condition holds, this allows us to state the following: 
Proposition 5. In industries served by oligopolies and characterized by innovation, all firms earn 
the highest profits from industry-wide myopic behavior. However, the Nash equilibrium is for all 
firms to be progressive. 
Proof: Using the standard payoff matrix, we construct the potential payoffs for the possible 
outlook combinations (myopic or forward-looking) for our two firms. The result follows from a 
traditional prisoner’s dilemma type outcome.  
As already shown in equation (26A), if both firms use the same discount rate (we denote 
the symmetry with *) then both firms profit increases with myopic outlooks. This means if we 
compare the myopic outcome (denoted with m, so * * *, , mi m j m    ) to the progressive outcome 
(denoted with f, so * * *, ,i f j f f    ), then 
* *
mf  . In the event that firms have different 
outlooks, so that one firm behaves myopically and the other is progressive, we know from (26B) 
that the myopic firm’s product will have lower appeal.26 Using the firm optimal price strategy from 
                                                 
26 We focus on the two firm case, but the proof could be expanded to N firms. 
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equation, we can solve for the myopic firm’s market share as a function of both firms appeal using 
equation (14A): 
   
, 2
A A P Pj ii j
xi m
 

   
             (27) 
Examining equations (27) and firm’s optimal price shows us that when a firm behaves myopically 
relative to its competition, the result is that the firm develops a less appealing product with a lower 
price which results in a loss of market share.27 Therefore, the progressive firm will charge a higher 
price and capture a greater share of the market, resulting in higher profit (
, ,i m j f
  ). This gives 
us the following payoff matrix:28  
Table 1.1 Payoff Matrix 
 
 
 Firm i 
  Myopic Far-Sighted 
Firm j 
Myopic 
* *
, ,i m j m   ,, j mi f
   
Far-Sighted , ,i m j f
   * *
, ,i f j f
   
Note that if only one firm is behaving myopically, that firm will have an incentive to change 
its outlook, as the firm will recapture its lost market share and increase its profits with a progressive 
outlook. Therefore, we can conclude that the Nash equilibrium is for both firms to be progressive. 
However, the greatest payoff comes from both behaving myopically.   
While our approach assumes consumer preferences for the two firm is perfectly split, if we 
expand our analysis to general case with N firms (each with an equal amount of product 
                                                 
27 If we let A A aj i  , then firms charge ( / 3)P ai     and ( / 3)P aj    . The resulting market share is 
( / 2) ( / 6 )x a     and 1 ( / 2) ( / 6 )x a     . 
28 Myopic behavior corresponds to a big ρ, while progressive behavior corresponds to a small ρ. 
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differentiation), then we can examine the outlook of an individual firm relative to the industry’s 
outlook and determine the effect via profit. If we assume that with the exception of firm i, the 
remaining N-1 firms act identically, then j  (where where j ∈ [1, N-1]) represents an arbitrary 
firm’s profits.  Even though the magnitudes may change, the inequalities from the two-firm game 
hold in the case of N firms, thus our results are expandable to N firms.     Q.E.D. 
The question thus becomes: is it possible for firms to collude and maintain a myopic 
arrangement? In a duopoly market, the firms’ dominant strategy is to be progressive. Therefore, if 
one firm maintains a myopic outlook, while the others become more progressive, the progressive 
firms will gain market share and increase their profits, at the myopic firm’s expense. In a traditional 
single turn game, we could safely conclude that all the firms will maintain a progressive 
perspective. However, given that this game repeats continuously in the optimal control setting, 
there is evidence by Duffy and Ochs (2009) that firms will be able to cooperate and maintain an 
agreement.29 This shows that cooperation in innovation may impede development, thus providing 
conditions, which contradicts the results by Teece (1992), which shows that cooperative behavior 
enhances innovation. 
 5.3 Industry Suspects 
Depending on a firm’s strategies, it is conceivable that a myopic arrangement can be 
maintained and that this strategy may occur in some industries. The difficultly comes in identifying 
myopic behavior in the marketplace due to the challenges of measuring innovation. However, we 
provide two possible suspects in order to help illustrate the potential for such arrangements. The 
                                                 
29 For additional strategies that will yield this equilibrium see Bergin and Bernhardt (2009) which discusses how 
cooperation can occur through imitation. 
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U.S. automotive and telecommunications are industries with high fixed costs of production.  Some 
business commentators have suggested both industries lacked foresight in recent years.  
In 2008, the big three automakers (Ford, GM, Chrysler) experienced decreased demand for 
their vehicles. Several factors may have contributed to decreased demand, such as higher gas prices 
or demand shifts to different products. Both of these factors influenced automakers beyond the big 
three. However, the magnitude of these effects was not uniform. The disproportionately large 
effects on the big three could be a result of their failure to develop and innovate at the pace of 
competitors, specifically in fuel-efficient models. If the managers of these firms shared a belief 
that US-made vehicles guarantee a certain share of the market due to brand loyalty, then little 
investment in innovation may have been the optimal strategy. 
The telecommunications industry is another example.  Initially, U.S. internet speeds rivaled 
all other countries, but now lag other high and middle-income countries (Akamai Technologies, 
2014). While tools necessary to increase speeds are available, internet service providers (ISPs) 
need to invest and incorporate new products into their network in order to increase speeds.  With 
a shared belief in a secure domestic market insulated from foreign competitors, ISPs in the US 
may have benefitted collectively from a slow pace of development (Fung 2014). However, as noted 
above, this equilibrium is unstable and disrupted by a single innovative firm. The introduction of 
Google Fiber highlighted the limited amount of investment by major ISPs (Gustin 2012). After the 
introduction of Google’s more innovative product, other ISPs have begun making upgrades of their 
own (Finley 2013). 
Both automotive and telecommunications are industries requiring innovation to maintain 
competitiveness, thus requiring continuous and large investments in R&D.  While the connection 
between our analysis and these markets is quite loose, we believe they provide examples of 
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systematic myopic behavior in an industry, which is optimal for the firms involved but harmful to 
consumers and (potentially) welfare.30 This also reinforces Stein (1989), since the incentive for the 
firm to behave myopically is present in both monopoly and duopoly settings. However, we are not 
implying that industry myopia is widespread. On the contrary, it seems more likely that rival firms 
would be unlikely to maintain a myopic cartel based on the pace of innovation. One thing we can 
conclude about the prevalence of myopic industries is their unlikelihood in industries with low/no 
barriers to entry. 
 6. Conclusion 
Using an optimal control approach, we are able to obtain similar results to those of: Chen 
and Schwartz (2013), using a static model; and those by Cellini and Lambertini (2011), using a 
dynamic game. However, unlike previous papers, our structure accounts for traditional product 
innovation and incorporates product appeal in the presence of consumer heterogeneity. We 
evaluate additional temporal effects of R&D. We show conditions for a duopoly to be more 
innovative and strictly welfare enhancing, relative to a monopoly. This yields additional insights 
unattainable by previous models.  
Our analysis does not end the Schumpeter-Arrow debate but adds perspective through a 
common framework in which both lines of argument have validity. The resources obtained by a 
monopoly certainly provide the means to invest more heavily in R&D relative to a competitive 
firm. However, the competitive firm must innovate in order maintain its market share. While our 
                                                 
30 If the industry outlook becomes more myopic, we know that consumer surplus will decrease in both market types 
since * 0CS    and 0MCS    , but total surplus may or may not decrease, since 0MTS    and * 0TS     (if 
2 22 2 3 0c    ). 
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approach provides no closure to this argument, it does explain why empirical analysis may yield 
results matching either Schumpeter or Arrow.  
What we find is that the monopolist maximizes innovation, ceteris paribus. However, in 
our analysis we include welfare measure and find that competition is likely to increase total 
surplus. This adds a new dimension to the debate about innovation. As stated by Baumol (2002): 
“Probably the most powerful force that may well lead to the continuation of the 
remarkable growth in innovation activity is the adoption of innovation as the prime 
weapon of competition in many of the leading oligopolistic sectors of the economy.” 
There is no doubt that competition is a necessary component when discussing innovation. 
However, the industry structure and outlook have additional implications as well. Furthermore, we 
believe the reason this statement still holds is the indirect effect competition has on a firm’s 
outlook.  
While we cannot undermine the justification of industry performance provided by 
Holmstrom (1989) and Stein (1989), we are able to provide an alternative reason for firm myopia. 
The value of our approach is in the new depth provided in the innovation/competition debate by 
including the firm’s outlook and its relationship to industry outlook.  By using a dynamic game in 
continuous time, we find that not only is the structure of the market important for innovation, but 
also the outlook of the firms. Based off the potential on firms’ strategies, we find reasons why 
myopic behavior may or may not be systemic to an industry. This highlights another angle for anti-
trust regulation, with potential implication for both oligopoly and monopoly markets.  The 
implications of systemic myopic groupthink are detrimental to both the consumer and overall 
innovation. However, the challenge comes in identifying the behavior. 
Our analysis, of course, is a simplified representation of the complex and detailed 
innovation process. While it may not fully capture all the benefits of innovation in a market, our 
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structure can be modified to integrate a myriad of other features (spillover, higher marginal cost, 
cooperation, regulation, etc.), which may yield additional interesting results. For now, we are able 
to show that if we ignore concerns about myopic behavior, that competition erodes innovation. 
However, we have also shown that maximizing welfare may come at the expense of innovation, 
or vice versa.  
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Chapter 2 - Green Product Certification, Heterogeneous Firms,  
and Green Consumers 
 1.  Introduction 
Environmental awareness has grown drastically over the last several decades. As concerns 
have developed, consumer taste and preference in the products they purchase have shifted.  
Preferences for greener products have become ubiquitous; as such the demand for green products 
continues to expand.  This demand is what has driven the market for green products (Michels, 
2008). Hamilton and Zilbermann (2006), in reference to a marketing intelligence service,31 indicate 
that “green products account for approximately 9% of new-products introductions in the United 
States.”  Furthermore, consumer spending on LOHAS (lifestyles of Health and Sustainability) 
related products has already eclipsed $250 billion according to LOHAS journal (Dosey, 2010). 
However, consumer preference for green products is far from uniform. The typical 
approach incorporates consumer heterogeneity either by location (e.g., Kurtyka and Mahenc 2011; 
Conrad 2005) or by the level of green preference (e.g., Amacher et al. 2004). Much of the 
contemporary literature analyzing green preferences assumes that consumers can directly observe 
a firm’s emissions and the benefits from clean production, thus making government intervention 
straightforward. 
The introduction of new “green” products adds additional utility for consumers with green 
preferences, but claims made by the producers of green products often comes into question. Similar 
to credence products discussed by Baron (2011), consumers do not have access to the necessary 
information about green products to verify the claims of producers.  These asymmetries in the 
                                                 
31 In their paper, Hamilton and Zilbermann (2006) refer to ProductScan Online, Marketing Intelligence Service Ltd. 
1999. 
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market for green products have led to the development of third party verification or certification, 
by so called “green clubs.”  In the market where product quality information is asymmetric, green 
clubs represent an important tool for both green consumers and producers.  Firms that voluntarily 
join green clubs are subjected to verification and additional standards.  This differs from voluntary 
agreements and standards discussed by Segerson and Miceli (1998), which are proposed as an 
alternative to regulation or legislation.  
But what benefits do firms receive from certification?  As noted by Potoski and Prakash 
(2005), club participation is effective because “its broad positive standing with external audiences 
provides a reputational benefit…”32  Basically, “…firms can differentiate their product from those 
of firms whose products do not meet the standard” (Baron 2011).As a result, socially responsible 
firms and their verified green products are capable of gaining a positive reputation and a premium 
in an expanding market. As green products have become more prevalent, so too have third party 
monitors.  The EPA lists dozens of programs or “clubs” to verify and promote use of clean methods 
of production (EPA 2014).  
 New studies have begun evaluating green products when consumers are unable to directly 
identify a firm’s environmental attributes. To inform consumers, firms require certification either 
by using eco-labeling or joining green clubs.  These certifications have been evaluated under 
various market structures, such as product types (Hamilton and Zilberman 2006), available 
technologies (Mason 2006), and in the context of environmental innovation (Dosi and Moretto 
2001).  While it has been shown that emission standards may not necessarily increase social 
welfare (Moraga-Gonzalez and Pardon-Fumero 2002), others such as Grolleau et al. (2007) have 
                                                 
32 This is in reference to ISO 14001, a green club with over 1,500 members in the United States.  See Potoski and 
Prakash (2005). 
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analyzed the strategic aspect of imperfect certification.  Mason (2011) assumes certification is a 
noisy test with potentially incorrect outcomes, while van’t Veld and Kotchen (2011) evaluate 
several certification types and discusses how imperfect monitoring can affect market outcomes 
and product standards using implicit functions. 
Examining firms with different costs for abatement or environmental friendliness is also 
commonly studied in the environmental literature.  However, the analysis is frequently limited in 
variety.  Doni and Ricchiuti (2013); Moraga-Gonzalez and Pardon-Fumero (2002); and Amacher 
et al. (2004) evaluate how heterogeneous costs affect market outcomes in the presence of 
heterogeneously concerned consumers.  However, the number of firms is limited to two (high and 
low cost), while allowing consumers a range of preferences for the firms products. Because of 
restrictions places on market structures, policy work by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) which shows 
that socially optimal outcome can be achieved using an emission tax, may not be applicable to all 
industries due to their structure. 
Our goal is to further develop an analytical framework for analyzing the heterogeneity of 
firms, so we can expand the policy implications beyond the duopoly or high/low cost firm 
approach.  Similar to Ben Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed (2008); Baksi and Bose (2006), we focus 
our analysis on issues related to the use of eco-certification in the presence of heterogeneous 
consumers.  However, we wish to take into account the decisions of heterogeneous firms in a 
competitive market, which is important for several reasons.  First, environmental friendliness is 
not limited to duopoly or even the oligopoly case.  Second, a firm’s abatement costs and profits 
are certainly not uniform, especially when a market is served by heterogeneous firms with 
differential costs of production.  Third, we can evaluate how eco-certification and environmental 
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regulation affect the endogeneity of market structure in terms of the number of green and non-
green firms.  Specifically, our analysis allows for the exit of firms from a market. 
Our approach shows that the number of green firms, the level of environmental standard, 
and the level of overall welfare under the competitive market solution are all socially sub-optimal.  
This leads us to examine what are possible measures by government to correct the Pareto sub-
optimality.  We find that the introduction of a subsidy policy for greener production or a tax charge 
for green certification by a club (which we refer to as an “eco-certification tax”) generates a 
positive effect social welfare.  Nevertheless, this welfare-improving policy is not Pareto optimal 
(i.e., it is a second-best outcome).  This prompts us to analyze the efficacy of dual policy 
instruments that combine subsidizes for a greener production standard and an eco-certification tax.  
We show that this dual-tool policy helps achieve the first-best or Pareto-optimal outcome in 
environmental standards and overall welfare. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the analytical 
framework for heterogeneous consumers, heterogeneous firms, and green clubs.  We then derive 
the equilibrium outcome under perfect competition. In Section 3, we examine the socially optimal 
outcome, which serves as the benchmark to show the Pareto sub-optimality of the market 
equilibrium.  In Sections 4 and 5 we focus our analyses on welfare implications of two 
environmental policies: one involves a single-tool policy on greener production or certification, 
and the other involves a double-tool policy of both greener production subsidies and a green 
certification tax.  Section 6 concludes. 
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 2. The Analytical Framework  
 We beginning our analysis by considering green production as a two-stage game in the 
absence of government intervention.33  This allows us to examine the equilibrium outcome of the 
game under the market solution.  In the first stage, a green club determines the certification 
standard that a firm’s product should meet in order for the firm to be qualified as a member.  Once 
the green product standard is set, the second stage occurs, and firms determine if they should join 
the green club and produce certified green products. 
 To characterize market interaction between firms and consumers, we first discuss the 
preferences of consumers. 
 2.1 Heterogeneous Consumers  
Following Hotelling’s spatial framework, we assume that consumers with heterogeneous 
preferences are uniformly distributed between zero and one of a market line. However, we 
determine the consumer’s location on the Hotelling line by using the strength of their green 
preference.  For analytical simplicity, we assume that each consumer purchases one unit of a 
product, whether it is green or non-green.  The preference function of a consumer located at ,x
where [0,1]x , is specified as follows: 
(1 ) ( )       if purchasing green product 
( )
                                  if purchasing non-green product
ev x P P
U x
v P
 

    
 
 
         (1) 
where v  represents the utility from the non-green product, P  represents market price of the non-
green product, eP  represents the mark-up for the green product,   is the abatement or 
“environmental friendliness” of the green product, and   scales the “warm glow” or utility from 
                                                 
33Another stage of policy implementation is added when we evaluate regulatory implications. 
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consuming the green product.34 Therefore, the degree of a consumers' environmental 
conscientiousness in purchasing the green product is represented by (1 ) .x   This means that 
consumers close to zero (one) place a high (low) value on green product.  As in van’t Veld and 
Kotchen (2011), we use   to capture the benefit to the public of having one unit of the green 
product.  The overall benefit (i.e., positive externality) to the public of the green product market is 
then measured by ,  where n   and n  is the total quantity of the green product sold in the 
market.  Note that the value of  n  remains to be determined in equilibrium. 
Setting the utility from green consumption equal to the utility from non-green consumption, 
we have from (1) that (1 ) ( ) ,ev x P P v P          which implies that the marginal 
green consumer or the quantity of the green product demanded ( Dn ) is:  
1-D eD
P
n x
t
                   (2) 
The number of green consumers is represented by the interval [0, ],Dx  while the number 
of non-green consumers is [ ,1].Dx 35  Next, we discuss the production decisions of firms. 
 2.2 Heterogeneous Firms 
Similar to Mason (2011), we examine the scenario where consumers cannot identify a 
firm's environmental friendliness, thus firms must join a club in order for environmental 
friendliness to be recognized.  Borrowing from van’t Veld and Kotchen (2011), we assume that 
the cost of managing a green club is increasing in the number of member firms.  But, we explicitly 
                                                 
34Here we assume that  and  are not correlated. However, Teisl et al.(2002) suggest that one aim of green labels is 
to “educate consumers about the environmental impacts of the product’s manufacture, use, and disposal, thereby 
leading to a change in purchasing behavior…” Thus, it’s possible that higher standards could actually shift user utility 
green products by increasing awareness of their negative impacts. However, we leave this for a future study. 
35 As the number of consumers is normalized to one, we have 0 1 ( ) 1,eP     which implies  that 0.eP    
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represent club costs, and assume they are quadratic in the number of members:
2Cl(y ) = ( ) ,S Sy  
where Sy  is the number of firms that join the club.  The club’s costs thus represent the expenses 
of having products inspected and certified. Since costs are shared equally among all member firms, 
each individual’s membership fee is .Sy   As a result, the membership fees received by the club 
are equal to the club’s operating costs. 
To reflect the heterogeneity of firms, we consider a case similar to Fischer and Lyon 
(2014), where firms are uniformly distributed according to their differing marginal costs of 
production.  As in Baron (2011), we assume that each firm produces one unit of product (green or 
non-green).  Following Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) and Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009), 
we further consider that abatement associated with the green product is quadratic in cost. The profit 
function for an arbitrary firm, y, is then represented by: 
2       if producing a green product in a club
( )
                                if producing non-green product
eP P y ky c yy
P c yk
      
  
 
        (3) 
where k  represents the highest level of Ricardian rent,36 c  represents the marginal cost of non-
green production, and   represents marginal cost of increasing a products’ cleanliness. We assume 
that firms that are more efficient (or have higher Ricardian rents), also have lower abatement costs.  
The market is competitive, but all firms have non-negative profits with the non-green product, so 
.P c k    Note that y is not bounded, thus allowing for free entry and exit, however, for any firm, 
y, where 1y  , then ( ) 0.y     
By equating the green product profit with the non-green profit, we can discern the marginal 
firm who is indifferent to either production type. We have from (3) that
                                                 
36 If firm located at 0, produced a non-green product, then it’s profit would be (0) (0) ( )P c k k c c k       
. Thus, there Ricardian rent is k. Similarly, at firm located at “1”, receives no profit or Ricardian rent. 
39 
 
2 .eP P y ky c y P c ky          
Solving the equation gives the marginal green firm37or the 
quantity of the green product supplied ( Sn ): 
2
S e
S
P
n y
 
 

                (4) 
Thus the number of green firms is represented by the interval [0, 
Sy ], while the number 
of non-green firms is [ ,1].Sy 38 
 2.3 Market Solution with a Green Club 
 In equilibrium, the quantity of a green product demanded is equal to that of the 
green product produced.39  Denoting n  in the subsequent analysis as the equilibrium quantity of 
the green product sold, we have from (2) and (4) that 
2
   e eD S
P P
n n n

  

   

              (5) 
This implies that the equilibrium premium for the green product satisfies the following 
condition:   
2( )
( )
eP
  
   


 
                (6) 
Substituting eP  from (6) back into (2) yields 
( )
n

   

 
                           (7) 
                                                 
37 Note that the marginal green firm, y,  has the property: .Sy y  
38We have the additional restriction that 
2 0 ( ) 1,eP      which implies that 
2 0 .eP      
39 The number of green products consumed is min{ , },D Sn x y where Sy is the number of green products produced, 
therefore  in equilibrium .D Sn x y   
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Instead of specifying one coordinator of the club such as industrial group, government, or 
environmentalist clubs, we consider a club that emphasizes product differentiation.  Our approach 
is congruent to those of Baron (2011), who recognizes that an organization (or in our case, a club) 
“provides product differentiation that segments the market.” This means that the club maximizes 
the green product’s cleanliness standard.  It is important to note that a club is likely to face multiple 
objectives.  To gain validity and differentiate their member’s products, a club must set and enforce 
higher standards.  In addition, a club requires firm participation in order for their labeling to be 
recognizable in the marketplace, thus club has a desire to increase membership.  Conversely, firms 
will not join a club unless there is sufficient demand for a green product.40  Therefore, our modeling 
coincides with the incentives clubs and firms will realistically face.41 Specifically, for the firms it 
requires both a green price premium ( 2
eP y y   ) and sufficient demand for the green product 
( n y ).42 
This means that a green club still maximizes its membership, but maintains an equilibrium 
in the green product market.  Obviously, if firms cannot sell their green product they have no 
incentive to pay for club membership; similarly if a shortage of the green product exists, clubs will 
seek more members or higher standards.  The cleanliness standard that maintains participation can 
be identified by taking the first-order condition for the club with respect to the level of 
environmental friendliness, which yields 
2
2 2
( )
( )
n   
   
 

  
 
                                                 
40 This condition ensures that the green club’s presence is welfare-increasing. This is not a necessary condition, but 
removing it could make the green clubs presence decrease social welfare (see Mattoo and Singh 1994). 
41 For analysis on different club types see van’t Veld and Kotchen (2011). Additional club types can be examined in 
our structure, however, our focus is policy and welfare implication, thus we leave that topic for future study.  
42 The value of n  should satisfy the following condition  -(  0.2 2)0 ( ) 1              
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Solving for the optimal standard specified by the green club (denoted by the superscript 
“GC”) yields: 
GC 

                  (8) 
Substituting 
GC  in (8) back into n  in (7), we have the equilibrium number of green firms 
in the market as: 
( 2 )
GCn

 


                (9) 
It follows immediately from (9) that 0 1.
GCn    Similarly, we substitute 
GC from (8) 
into (6) to identify the green product premium: 
2
2
GC
eP

 


              (10) 
Using GC in (8) we obtain the following comparative-static derivatives: 
0,
GC




 
2
0,
2
GC 
 

  

 and  
1
0
2
GC
 

 

                    (11) 
From (11), there are several interesting observations. First, consumer’s cleanliness 
preference does not influence the club standard. This could be interpreted as consumer’s ability to 
encourage the existence of a standard, but not to influence the level.  This may seem odd at first, 
but if we assume that green consumer would prefer all their products be clean, green clubs should 
be observed in every industries.  However, green products will only be brought to market if firms 
can remain profitable while providing the products.  All this depends firms’ costs, so higher 
environmental cleanliness or club costs determine whether a firm is subject itself to the standard. 
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Next, from 
GCn  in (9), we obtain:43 
2
2 2
2[ 4 ( )]
0
( 4 )
GCn     
  
 
 
 
         (12A) 
2
0
( 2 )
GCn 
   
 
 
 
          (12B) 
2
0
( 2 )
GCn 
   
 
 
 
          (12C) 
The signs in equations (12) come as no surprise.  As preferences for green products increase 
so does club participation. For firms, as the club membership or abatement costs increase, it 
disincentives club membership for marginal firms. 
Lastly, from GC
eP  in (10), we obtain: 
2
2 2
4 ( 4 4 )
0
( 4 )
GC
eP      
  
 
 
 
            (13A) 
2
2
2
0
( 2 )
GC
eP 
   
 
 
 
          (13B) 
2
2 ( )
0
( 2 )
GC
eP   
  

 
 
          (13C) 
Equations (13) show some interesting results with regards to the green price premium.  
First, as club membership fees rise the green price premium increases.  However, when abatement 
costs increase, the green price premium decreases.  The reason is that increasing abatement costs 
leads to lower standards being set by the club which reduces the level of product differentiation 
between green and non-green products.  As a consequence, the green price premium decreases.  
                                                 
43 It will be shown that in order for the club to exist and have members 2   must hold. 
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This, combined with our previous result, means that greater consumer preferences for a green 
product do not result in higher cleanliness standards set by the club, but instead affect the price of 
the green products. 
With all the results from the above comparative statics, we establish the first Proposition: 
Proposition 1. In a Hotelling-type spatial economy in which consumers choose between green and 
non-green products and heterogeneous firms may join a green club in order for environmental 
friendliness to be recognized (through green product certification), we have the following results: 
(i) An increase in ,  the degree of consumers’ environmental conscientiousness, increases 
both the quantity and price of the green product sold in the market. But the optimal level of 
environmental standard set by the green club is unaffected by .  
(ii) An increase in ,  the cost of abatement, reduces the quantity and price of the green 
product, while decreasing the green product’s standard.  
(iii) An increase in ,  the club membership cost, raises the green product’s standard and 
price, but lowers the quantity of the green product sold. 
 3. Evaluating the Market Solution from the Social Welfare Perspective   
 In this section, we derive the social welfare measures for the Hotelling’s spatial market 
presented in the above sections. This allows us to calculate the benefits derived from the market 
solution with a green club and compare it to the social planner’s solution.  A welfare comparison 
between the alternative scenarios will allows us to identify whether the market solution can 
maximize social welfare, and help determine the regulatory role of the government (if any). 
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 3.1 Social Welfare in the Market Solution 
We begin with the calculation of consumer benefits.  Note that    is the external benefit 
to the society from the sale of the green product, where .n    Integrating over all consumers 
buying either green or non-green products, the consumer surplus measure is given by 
1
0
[ (1 ) ( )] ( )
x
e
x
CS v x P P dx v P dx                 (14A) 
In equilibrium, the quantity of green product sold ( )n  is equal to the number of green 
consumers ( ).x  Using the competitive market property that the non-green product price is equal 
to its value or ,P v we simplify the expression in (14A) to be44 
 1 2 (2 ) eCS n x x P x             (14B) 
The consumer surplus measure in (14B) has three terms: public green benefit, private green 
benefit, and green premium, respectively.   
Similarly, integrating over all firms producing either green or non-green products, the 
producer surplus measure is given by 
1
2
0
( ) ( )
y
e
y
PS P P y ky c y dy P c yk dy                (15A) 
As before, we incorporate the competitive market property associated with the non-green 
product that its price is equal to the cost of production for the marginal firm, that is, ,P c k  we 
simplify the expression in (15A) to be45 
  2 21 2 2 ( )ePS k P y y              (15B) 
                                                 
44 For a detailed derivation of the consumer surplus measure, see Appendix F. 
45 For a detailed derivation of the producer surplus measure, see Appendix F. 
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The producer surplus measure in (15B) has three terms: Ricardian rents, green price 
premium, and green cost.   
As in the literature, social welfare is taken as the sum of consumer and producer surplus, 
which yields: 
    2 21 2 (2 ) 1 2 2 ( )e eSW n x x P x k P y y                   (16A) 
Evaluating SW in (16A) at the market equilibrium where ,x y n    we have: 
2 2(2 ) ( )
2 2 2
k n n n
SW n
  

 
           (16B) 
The four terms that constitute social welfare can be identified as: public green benefit, 
Ricardian rents, private green benefit, as well as green cost.  Substituting 
GC  and GCn  from (8) 
and (9) into the welfare function in (16B), after arranging terms, we have: 
(2 )
22 ( 2 )
GC kSW
   
  

 

             (17) 
Based on 
GCSW  in (17), we have several interesting observations.  First, as expected social 
welfare is strictly increasing with   and ,k  thus greater public benefits and Ricardian rents result 
in greater social welfare. Moreover, the comparative static derivatives of 
GCSW  in (17) with 
respect to ,  ,  and     are:  
 
2 2( )
2 2
2 4 4
0
2 ( 4 )
GCSW      
  
  
 

       (18A) 
3
2 2 2
(2 )[ 4 (4 3 )]
0
4 ( 4 )
GCSW        
  
   
  

       (18B) 
2 2
2 2
(2 )( 4 4 )
0
4 ( 4 )
GCSW        
  
   
 

       (18C) 
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The first two results in (18A) and (18B) are as expected. First, higher preferences for green 
products yield greater social welfare.  Secondly, as the cost of abatement increases, social welfare 
decreases.  The last derivative in (18C) is less intuitive and more significant.  For that reason, we 
state:  
Corollary 1. In the presence of heterogeneous firms, social welfare increases with higher 
club membership costs. 
Normally, a higher club cost should decrease social welfare since it discourages firms from 
joining a club and producing green products.  However, in the presence of heterogeneous firms 
the appeal of joining a club puts a pressure on the club to lower the standard and accept firms with 
higher abatement costs.  As shown in (7) and (13C), this lowers the green price premium and 
increases demand for the green product. If the club membership fee were higher, only firms with 
low abatement costs would find it beneficial to join. Furthermore, the lower abatement cost firms 
are more likely to accept a higher standard, which yields higher price premiums.  This result is 
analogous to Buchanan’s (1965) Theory of a Club which he describes as a “theory of optimal 
exclusion, as well as one of inclusion.” Basically, the argument is that the club needs members to 
operate, but the exclusivity of club is directly related to its effectiveness. 
To evaluate the efficacy of the market solution with a green club, we need to identify the 
conditions (in terms of the number of firms producing the green product and the level of 
environmental standard) under which social welfare is maximized.  This leads us to examine the 
environmental issues from the perspective of a social planner who seeks to maximize overall 
welfare.  
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 3.2 Optimal Welfare in the Social Planner’s Solution 
In the framework we consider, the socially optimal outcome is found using the approach 
by van’t Veld and Kotchen (2011).  The social planner determines optimal club size and standard, 
or values of 
 
and ,n
 
that maximize overall welfare as given in (16B).   The first-order Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are:  
 2 2 2
0
2
n n nSW    

  
 
  
and 2 0
SW
n n n
n
    

     

 
Assuming temporarily that these conditions are binding, the optimal values of 
 
and n
 
are: 
2 2
2
n
n
  


 
            (20A) 
( )
( )
n
  
   


 
              (20B) 
Substituting   from (20A) into n  in (20B) and considering the boundary conditions on the 
number of consumer’s purchasing the green product (0 1),Dn   we obtain candidates for the 
social planner’s (denoted with “SP”) equilibrium number of green firms: 
2
2 ( )
0,
4
SPn
  
 
 
  
 
              (21) 
Since 0 1,
SPn   this implies that 
2 20 2 2 4       .  In order for the club to exist, 
the condition that 
2 4 0    requires that 2 .    Evaluating the above condition 
2 22 2 4 ,        implies that 2 2 4 ,      which obviously cannot happen. We thus 
have the inequality condition that 
2 22 2 4 0.        This indicates that if the market 
contains a green club then the socially optimal number of green firms is: 
1SPn               (22A) 
Substituting 1
SPn   from (22a) back into   in (20) yields  
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2
2
SP  


             (22B) 
Based on 
SPn , SP ,  and the social welfare function in (16), we have  
2(2 )
8 2
SP kSW
  

 
            (22C) 
From (22c), the comparative-static derivatives of the social planner’s social welfare are: 
0,
SPSW




  0,
SPSW
k



  0,
SPSW




  0,
SPSW




  and  0.
SPSW




 
As before, public benefits from having a green product, Ricardian rents, and consumer 
preference for the green product all positively affect social welfare. Additionally, higher abatement 
costs negatively affect social welfare.  One key implication departing from the market solution 
with a green club is the negative effect of higher club membership costs on social welfare.  This 
seems appropriate, since the social planner decides the club participation and standard, the club 
costs no longer needs to disincentivize high cost firms from joining a club.  To summarize this 
result: 
Corollary 2. Higher club membership costs decrease the maximum attainable level of 
social welfare in the social planner's solution.  However, higher club costs increase social welfare 
in the market solution. 
In the previous section, we see that as the club become more exclusive by increasing the 
standard, members receive a higher green price premium. However, the social planner need not 
worry about the exclusiveness of the club-determined standard, since it can decide both the level 
of participation and the standard. Therefore, membership costs become a hurdle for a social planner 
that negatively affects social welfare. 
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 3.3 Comparison 
We begin by examining the differences between the market solution and the social 
planner’s solution.  We begin by evaluating the difference in the number of firms producing the 
green product.  In view of (9) and (22A), we see immediately that the market solution yields a 
lower level of firm participation than the social planner, or to state another way: .GC SPn n  
Next, we compare the environmental standard in each scenario by using 
GC  in (8) and 
,SP  in (22B). Assuming that the market solution yields a higher standard in order to identify 
conditions where ,
GC SP   we have 
2
2
  
 

                (23) 
It can easily be verified that this condition violates the constrained condition that 
2 .   Therefore, we conclude that the standard set by the green club in the market solution 
is strictly below that in the social planner’s solution. We thus have 
GC SP                (24) 
Finally, we verify differences in overall welfare using 
GCSW  in (17) and SPSW  in (22C).  
Again, we analyze whether the market solution is superior to the social planner’s solution, or 
specifically, .
GC SPSW SW This yields the following condition:  
  2
2
( 2 ) 2 (2 )
2 ( 4 ) 2 8 2
k k        
   
   
  

         (25) 
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Since 2   in the presence of green clubs, the social planner’s welfare is relatively 
higher.  That is, .GC SPSW SW 46   We thus have the following Proposition:  
Proposition 2. The market solution has a lower environmental standard, a lower number of green 
firms, and a lower level of overall welfare relative to the social planner’s solution. That is, 
,GC SP  ,GC SPn n .GC SPSW SW  
 4. Welfare Implications of a Single-Tool Environmental Policy 
We have shown that the market solution with a green club is Pareto sub-optimal, so 
naturally, some regulatory questions arise: What regulatory measures that can be taken by 
government to correct the Pareto sub-optimality?  Will subsidies for greener production standard 
be a socially optimal policy?  In this section, we examine the efficacy of various policies in the 
presence of a green club. Our approach is similar to that of Heyes and Maxwell (2004), who 
analyze the effects of regulatory policy and non-government labeling when both occur 
concurrently in a market.  However, our approach allows the club to act as a monitor of the firms 
actions, thus allowing the government to set regulation according to member firms actions.  
We begin by constructing green production as a three-stage game.  In the first stage, the 
government determines subsidies and taxes (either for abatement or club membership) to 
maximize social welfare.  In the second stage, the club sets the maximum level of cleanliness 
standard that maintains equilibrium in the green product market.  In the third and last stage, each 
                                                 
46 Showing that GC SPSW SW requires proving that 
2
[( ) ]( )
2
2 4 4 4 ( 2 )(2 ).                 If we let 2 ,a    this 
condition simplifies to: ( ) [( )
3 2 2
4 4 2 4 4 ] 0,a a a a                  which is sufficiently positive whenever 
2
a       and  22 4 4 .( )a        We assume these conditions hold. 
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profit-maximizing firm decides on joining join the club according to the standard and price for the 
green product. 
 4.1 Green Production with Abatement Subsidies 
In this case, we incorporate a tactic used by Segerson and Miceli (1998), where regulators 
use a “carrot” approach.  The government provides a subsidy (denoted as )As to the firm for each 
unit of abatement.  We can identify the number of green firms by solving by the following equality 
2 .e AP P y ky c y s P c yk             
This yields the marginal green firm or the quantity 
of the green product supplied as:      
, 2
e A
S A
P s
n y

 

 

              (26) 
One observation from (26) is that abatement subsidies increase the number of green 
firms.47   
As before, we solve for the quantity of the green product sold in the market by setting 
Dn
from (2) equal to ,S An  from (26), which yields 
2
e e AP P s 
  
 


 
In equilibrium, the green price premium must satisfy:   
2
2
( )A
e
s
P
   
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 

 
             (27) 
Substituting eP  back into Dn  yields
48 
                                                 
47 The number of green firms must satisfy this condition: 0 1.y  This implies that 0 1
2( ) ( )P se       or to 
state another way: 
2
0 .P se         
48Note the condition that  0 1
2[( ) ] ( )s           which implies that: 
2
( ) .s      
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( )
( )
Asn
 
   


 
                         (28) 
Taking the derivative of n  with respect to   and setting the resulting expressions to zero 
yields the optimal standard for the green club in the presence of an abatement subsidy (denoted 
by “CA”) scenario. That is,  
CA 

             (29A) 
Substituting CA  into n  from (28), we have 
( )
2
CA Asn

 



           (29B) 
With (29a), we calculate the equilibrium value of green premium,49 
2
2 ( ) ( 4 )
( 4 )
A ACA
e
s s
P
     
  
   
 

        (29C) 
Note the absence of the abatement subsidy in the clubs emission standard, while it is present 
in the green price premium and the equilibrium number of green firms.  From (29B), we can see 
that a higher abatement subsidy leads to more firms joining a club which, in turn, results in a lower 
green price premium. 
Next, we can determine if the abatement subsidy can yield the optimal number of green 
firms and the optimal emission standard.  Setting 
SP CAn n  leads to a subsidy of: 
* 2As                (30) 
Therefore, we conclude that obtaining the socially optimal number of green firms is 
possible with an emissions subsidy. 
                                                 
49The green product premium is positive, 0Pe  , if 
2( ) / .As       
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Using the same approach, we next determine the optimal abatement subsidy that generates 
the social planner’s emission standard by solving ,SP CA   which yields: 
2
2
  
 

            
which doesn’t hold since 2 .  Therefore, the abatement subsidy can never lead to the same 
standard. The resulting standard is always below that of the social planner’s.  We thus have 
Proposition 3. While an emission subsidy can yield the optimal green club participation, there is 
no emission subsidy that will generate the Pareto-optimal green standard in the market solution.  
That is, ,
CA SP  ,CA SPn n and .CA SPSW SW  
 4.2 Green Production with Membership Subsidies/Taxes 
We next examine the effects of a government subsidy (denoted as )Ms for firms when they 
join a club. Similar to the previous case, we can identify the number of green firms by solving the 
following equality: 2 .e MP P y ky c y s P c yk          Solving for y yields the supply of 
green products: 
, 2
e M
S M
P s
n y
 

 

             (31) 
Setting demand for green product, ,Dn  from (2) equal to the new supply of the green 
product, , ,S Mn  from (31), we have 
2
e e MP P s
  
 


 
In equilibrium, the green product premium must satisfy:   
2( )
( )
M
e
s
P
  
   
 

 
             (32) 
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Substituting eP  from (32) back into Dn  yields the equilibrium number of green firms:  
( )
Msn

   


 
             (33) 
Using (33), we solve for the optimal environmental standard for the green club with club 
membership tax or subsidy (denoted by “CM”) scenario, which yields  
( )CM Ms


            (34A) 
Substituting 
CM  from (36a) into n  in (34), we have  
[ 2 ( ) ]
2 4
MCM
s
n
   
 
 


          (34B) 
With equation (33), we calculate the green price premium as: 50 
2 ( ) ( )
(2 ) ( )
CM M
e
M
s s
P
s s
   
    
 

  
         (34C) 
Note the presence of the membership subsidy in the club emission standard, green price 
premium, and the quantity of green firms, unlike the emission subsidy case. 
Using the same approach as before, we determine the optimal membership subsidy/tax that 
results in the social planner’s emission standard by solving ,
SW CM   which yields:51 
2
* (2 )
4
Ms
 



               (35) 
                                                 
50Note that 0Pe   if  
2( ) .s      
51 The associated welfare calculations for the club membership case are provided in the appendix. 
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Careful examination of (35) shows that the optimal membership subsidy to ensure the 
social planner’s standard is actually a tax.52While this may seem counter-intuitive, recall that a 
club must ensure its members can sell their products. Therefore, if the government taxes club 
membership, it reduces the number of firms that produce the green product, thus allowing the club 
to raise its standard.  Unlike the emission subsidy scenario, a proper membership tax leads to the 
socially optimal emission standard. The tax can be considered a certification expense in the same 
spirit as Hamilton and Zilberman (2006), for that reason we refer to it as an eco-certification tax. 
Next, we determine if the proper eco-certification tax can yield the optimal number of firms 
and emission standards. Assuming that ,
SW CMn n  it must satisfy the condition .2
M
s    Given 
that ,
M
s  there are no values of Ms  that satisfy the inequality condition. Therefore, we have 
Proposition 4. While a tax charge for green certification can yield the optimal green standard, 
there is no membership subsidy/tax that will generate the socially optimal level of green club 
participation. That is, ,
CM SP  ,CM SPn n  and .CM SPSW SW  
 5. Welfare Implications of a Double-Tool Environmental Policy 
We have shown that even with an emission subsidy or club membership tax, the 
equilibrium outcome is Pareto sub-optimal. This suggests that there is no single policy tool capable 
of achieving the socially optimal outcome in the presence of green clubs.  In this section, we 
evaluate the use of dual tool by regulator, and examine if it can lead to the socially optimal 
outcome.  
                                                 
52 In order for 
* 0,Ms 
2
4 (2 )    must hold. If we let 2 ,     where 0,   then we can rewrite the previous 
inequality as:    4 4 2 4 4              , which cannot hold, thus implies that * 0.Ms   
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As in the previous analyses, we construct green production as a three-stage game. 
However, the first stage differs from our previous set-up. In the first stage, the government 
determines both the abatement and club membership subsidies/taxes to maximize social welfare.  
The second and third stages of the game remain unchanged: the club sets the cleanliness standard 
while maintaining equilibrium in the green product market.  In last stage, each firm decides on 
joining the club according to the demand for the green product. 
 5.1 A Double-Tool Approach 
Similar to the previous section, we begin by introducing the subsidy for green production 
( )S  and subsidy for club membership ( )  in the green firm profit function.  As before, we identify 
the number of firms in the green product market by solving: 
2 ,eP P y ky c y S P c yk             for .y  This gives the supply of green products: 
, 2
e
S D
P S
n y
 
 
 
 

             (36) 
To determine the equilibrium number of green firms, we set the supply and demand for 
the green product equal to one another using (36) and (2), respectively.  This yields 
, 2
  e eD S D
P P S
n n
  
  
  
  

    
Solving for the green product premium gives:   
2( )
( )
e
S
P
    
   
  

 
             (37) 
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Substituting eP  from (37) back into Dn  in (2), we have the equilibrium number of green 
firms:53 
( )
( )
S
n
  
   
 

 
              (38) 
Taking the derivative of n  with respect to   and setting the resulting expression to zero, 
gives the optimal environmental standard for the green club with the dual policy (denoted by 
“CD”) as: 
( )
CD
S


 
 


           (39A) 
where 
2 2[ ( ) ( )].S S            Substituting CD  back into n  from (38), we have  
2
2
( )
2 ( 2 )
CD
S
n
S

  
 

   
         (39B) 
Making use of (37) and (39b), we calculate the green price premium as54 
2
2
( )[2 ( ) ( 2 )]
( )[2 ( )( 2 )]
CD
e
S S
P
S S
    
     
      

     
      (39C) 
 5.2 Social Planner’s Solution with Dual Policy 
The eco-certification tax shows up in the club emission standard, green price premium, and 
the number of green firms, unlike the emission subsidy case. In addition, the abatement subsidy 
shows up in the green price premium and the number of green firms.  This means that potentially, 
the eco-certification tax could be used to optimize the club standard, while the emission subsidy 
could be used to optimize club participation. 
                                                 
53Note that  0 1,
2[( ) ] [ ]s            which implies that: 
2
( ) .s        
54Note that 0eP   if  
2( ) .s        
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We begin by setting the dual policy club standard equal to social planner’s club standard, 
or ,
CD SP  which yields: 
(2 )
( ) 2S
  
  
  


               (40A) 
Solving for the club eco-certification tax that yields the socially optimal club standard, we 
have: 
   
2
[4 2 ]
8( )
S    

  
  


          (40B) 
Therefore, using (40A) as our club membership policy rule, we ensure the optimal club 
standard is obtainable.  Substituting  in (40B) back into (39B) yields 
2( )
CD Sn

 



             (41) 
Setting 
CDn in (41) equal to the socially optimal number of firms, i.e., 1,
CD SPn n  and 
solving for the optimal emission subsidy, we have 
* 2S                (42A) 
Using *S  in (42A), we simplify the optimal eco-certification tax provided in (40B) to:  
2
* (2 )
4
 
 


                 (42B) 
Together, the results in (42A) and (42B) provide a dual policy rule that ensures the first-
best solution.  Or to state another way: 
Proposition 5: While a single tool policy cannot yield the socially optimal outcome, a dual tool 
policy is the first best or Pareto optimum, if the government sets dual policy of 
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* 2(2 ) 4        and * 2 .S      That is, given *S  and * ,  we have ,CD SP  ,CD SPn n  
and .
CD SPSW SW  
If government adopts a dual policy which combines subsidizes for a greener production 
standard and taxes for the club membership of green firms, the policy is able to achieve Pareto 
optimality in environmental standards, the number of green firms, and overall welfare.   
 6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have endeavored to analyze welfare implications of environmental 
regulations for an economy in which heterogeneous consumers choose between green and non-
green products, and firms may join a green club in order for environmental friendliness to be 
recognized.  In the analysis, we take into account the heterogeneity of firms in production and 
abatement costs. This allows us examine competitive markets, and analyze how eco-certifications 
and environmental regulation affect the endogeneity of green production. While previous work 
has primarily focused on evaluating oligopoly market structures, our results are distinctly different 
from previous studies and have implications for club and regulatory decisions within a competitive 
market. 
We have shown that club operation in a competitive market is welfare-improving and, 
similar to Ibanez and Grolleau (2008), decreases the level of pollution.  However, it results in a 
lower number of green firms with a lower environmental standard than is socially optimal. The 
implementation of environmental policies can help improve Pareto optimality or efficiency.  In 
addition, the use of an abatement subsidy increases club participation, which is welfare-improving, 
but is not Pareto optimal.  Applying an eco-certification tax is also welfare-improving, but is still 
sub-optimal. Unlike previous research analyzing duopoly markets in the context of eco-labels, our 
results show that there is no single policy which will yield the socially optimal outcome.  
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Finally, we suggest the implementation of a mixed policy, which combines subsidizes for 
a greener production standard and a certification tax for firms that want to join a green club.  This 
policy mix is shown to be Pareto optimal (that is, the first-best optimum) in environmental 
standards and overall welfare, and therefore shows the potential gains from regulatory involvement 
in competitive markets with green clubs. 
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Chapter 3 - R&D Investment in Clean Technology 
 1. Introduction 
 The relationship between investment and clean technology has become an important topic 
in the regulatory and environmental literature.  Using a Pigovian approach in high emission 
industries is not a new topic, but much of the new environmental research has shifted to identifying 
the incentives of firms to undertake development of clean technology in the context of 
environmental regulation.  Initiating an emissions tax is a common approach to internalize the 
negative effects of production emissions.  However, with the development of new emission-
reducing technology identifying the best policy becomes even more challenging.  Large emissions 
taxes may erode a firms’ profit, but increases the benefits of developing clean-technology. 
Conversely, smaller tax rates allow firms to enjoy higher profits, providing firms additional 
resources to develop clean technology.   
If we view clean technology development as a special case of innovation,55 the effects of 
environmental regulation can extend beyond a firm’s emissions, but influence the development of 
technology.  Several papers have evaluated the relationship between innovation and competition.  
Arrow (1962) showed that the incentive to invest may be greater under monopoly than in a 
competitive setting.  However, Schumpeter (1934) showed a positive relationship between 
innovation and market power.  This demonstrates a glimpse of how challenging it is to identifying 
firm’s incentive to innovate. Contemporary work such as Cellini and Lambertini (2009) has started 
to evaluate how R&D structure affects innovation. One interesting question that appears not to 
                                                 
55 For a richer discussion about innovation and clean technology, see Jaffe et al. (2002). 
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have been systematically analyze concerns how the introduction of environmental policies change 
a firm’s incentive to undertake R&D in clean technology. 
Analyzing the impacts of environmental policy on clean technology development under 
imperfect competition has a renewed interest in the environmental literature.  Contemporary 
research has expanded on previous findings by including important characteristic into the market 
framework, such as: evaluating the transfer of environmental technology between countries (Iida 
and Takeuchi; 2011), licensing technology (Kim et al., 2012) and how regulation affects a firm’s 
decision to develop clean technology “in house” or license it (Heyes and Kapur, 2011). 
 Previous literature has overwhelming shown how environmental policy incentivizes clean 
technology development.  This research points out an important relationship between taxes and 
investment, which facilitates a strategic approach, such as those by Ulph and Ulph (2007) and 
Greaker and Rosendahl (2008).  Thus, our understanding of a firm’s decision in the face of 
environmental policy helps identify optimal tax policies (Kurtyka and Mahenc, 2011). Work by 
Canton et al. (2008) indicates the challenges of identifying optimal tax rate in the presence of 
imperfect competition, while showing the relationship between abatement and production. 
Although the strategic approach can also include a myriad of details, the development of 
technology is frequently limited to the static case.  As revealed by Beladi, Liu, and Oladi (2013), 
a dynamic approach has the benefit of showing the long-run environmental implications of a 
policy.  Furthermore, studies by Malueg and Tsutsui (1997); and Cellini and Lambertini (2009) 
show how important a dynamic approach is to R&D.  
We hope to show that by incorporating a dynamic structure into the development of clean 
technology, we obtain better understanding of a firm’s response to regulation. By using an optimal 
control and dynamic game approach, we can determine a firm’s investment “path” in the presence 
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of a given policy, as opposed to the firm’s one time investment decision.  While the static approach 
can provide an insightful “snapshot,” the additional details provided in a dynamic setting are 
paramount in the context of cumulative effects, such as those exhibited by R&D. Feichtinger et al. 
(2014) highlights the richness obtained by using a dynamic approach. They construct a non-
cooperative differential game, where firm decide to undertake R&D projects for emission 
abatement, in the presence of a (constant endogenous) Pigovian tax policy. The authors’ results 
show the existence of an open-loop equilibrium and show a concave relationship between 
investment and the number of firms thus creating an inverted-U investment curve.  With the 
exception of Feichtinger et al. (2014), much of current environmental research treats clean 
technology development and pollution abatement in the static setting.  
The purpose of the present paper is to identify a firm’s clean-tech investment strategy in 
response to an emissions tax when R&D is represented dynamically. This approach has the benefit 
of capturing explicitly the cumulative effect of R&D investment within an environmental 
framework.  Using this structure, we examine three different investment strategies (competition, 
cooperation, and merging) under duopoly, and identify each firm’s optimal R&D response in the 
context of firm emissions, environmental damage, and social welfare.  Furthermore, our research 
shows the relationship between emissions taxes and firm’s clean-tech investment, thus providing 
details about incentives created by emissions taxes.    
In contrast to the traditional static analysis, which does not allow for temporal or 
cumulative effects of R&D, our dynamic analysis has implications for emission tax policy and 
cooperation in environmental innovation to improve overall welfare. The key findings of the 
present study are as follows: (i) As an emission tax or the level of emissions decreases, the 
incentive to invest in clean technology decreases. (ii) A welfare-improving emissions tax policy 
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requires that the tax rate adjust with the development of clean technology.  (iii) Emissions per unit 
of output and total environmental damage are lowest when firms cooperate in R&D, relative to the 
scenarios when they compete in R&D or merge into a single entity. (iv) A forward-looking firm 
increases total surplus and has lower environmental damage than a myopic firm.  (v) Social welfare 
is at the highest level under the cooperative R&D regime.   
The remainder of the paper has the following structure.  Section 2 first presents the set-up 
of each firm’s dynamic optimization problem when duopolists compete in clean-technology R&D 
in the presence of an emissions tax.  We then show the dynamic movements of emissions and 
investments, and discuss emission tax implications.  In section 3, we further derive the steady state 
solutions for the three alternative regimes: R&D competition, R&D cooperation, and the merging 
into a single entity.  Section 4 evaluates and compares the three different regimes in terms of their 
effects on environmental damage, firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare.  Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 2. Modeling Emissions & Clean Technology Innovation  
As in Cellini and Lambertini (2009), we consider a market served by a Cournot duopoly, 
with inverse demand:  1 2 ),(P a q q   where iq  is the quantity of output produced by firm  
( i = 1,2) and a represents the choke price.  We further assume that each unit of output by firm i 
yields iE  units of pollution, which is taxed at rate τ.
56  For convenience, we assume marginal cost 
is zero.  
In addition, the government exogenously sets the emission tax, which remains constant. 
This is an important divergence from Feichtinger (2014), which uses an (constant) endogenous tax 
                                                 
56 To guarantee that each firm produces a positive quantity of output,  it will be shown that this emission tax rate 
satisfies the following condition: 0 .a Ei   
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rate. By endogenizing the tax rate, they are forced to optimize social welfare in the steady-state 
only, whereas we make no assumption about the time period being optimized by the implemented 
policy. We do this for several reasons.  First, environmental regulation is highly politicized, and 
therefore updates or changes occur infrequently and may not be optimal57. Second, even in the 
face of popular support for an environmental regulation, governments may still implement a 
constant (potentially sub-optimal) tax rate58.  Finally, we will show the problems that arise from 
instituting a dynamic endogenous tax rate. However, our approach will provide several useful 
insights about the construction of a welfare enhancing emission policy.    
 2.1 Dynamic R&D Optimization: Problems of Duopolistic Firms  
Each period firm i’s operating profit after paying emission taxes is  i i iP E q   .  
Substituting in the inverse demand gives firm i’s profit as  1 2 )( .i i ia q q E q      This 
indicates that each firm will not produce if at any time .ia E  From the profit function, we can 
obtain firm i’s best response function as ( ) / 2i j iq a q E    for , 1,2i j  and .i j  Substituting 
firm j’s best response function into firm i’s best response function, we have firm i’s optimal output 
equation as ( 2 ) / 3.i i jq a E E     Since our focus is investment in clean technology substituting 
firm i’s optimal output into its profit function allows us to express each firm’s Cournot profit as a 
function of both firms’ emissions:: 
2( 2 ) / 9.i i ja E E      
                                                 
57 Several examples exist where policies are enacted but haven’t been updated, such as carbon taxes (of various levels) 
in European countries. The U.S. gasoline tax could also be viewed as an emission tax, which has not been updated 
since 1997 (Federal Highway Administration website, Highway History Retrieved May 2014) . In 1980, Sweden 
instituted a nitrogen oxide emissions tax, which wasn’t updated until 2008 (OECD Environmental Policy Paper No.2 
Dec. 2013). Regardless, these policies do not change without the creation and implementation of new policy.  
58 As mentioned in “We have a winner” article from The Economist, British Columbia instituted a carbon tax of C$10 
in 2008, with incremental increases until it reached C$25 in 2012. A poll mentioned in the article states that “ the tax 
is popular: it is backed by 54%.” As of the writing of this article, there have been no changes to the carbon tax rate. 
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Firms invest in clean technology in order to reduce their tax burden and maximize their 
individual profits. Firms reduce their emissions through R&D in process innovation, which results 
in pollution abatement during production. For this reason, we would expect marginal cost of 
production to be unaffected by a firm’s emission reductions, thus its omission is appropriate.59 As 
frequently assumed in the R&D investment literature, each firm’s expenditure on the development 
of clean technology is taken to be a quadratic function.  That is, this expenditure function is 2 ,iV
where iV  is the level of emissions-reduction investment by firm i.  Thus, firm i  selects the level 
of investment in each period in order to maximize the current-value of its’ profit function, 
according to the following dynamic optimization problem: 
     
,
2
, , ,
0
1
max ( 2 )
9i t
t
i i t j t i t
V
a E E V e dt 

     
       s.t.    ?̇? , , ,( )i t i t i tV E         (0)i oE E             (1) 
where 1,2 for ,i i j    is the discount rate, δ  is the cost of maintaining clean technology, and  
is a parameter measuring the effectiveness of an investment to curbing emissions, oE  is the initial 
emission rate per-unit of production. We assume that each firm’s technology development affects 
emissions during production and does not have any spillover effect, thus our approach omits any 
feedback effects.   
 The dynamic optimization framework as specified in (1) has several advantages over the 
traditional static case.  First, by using this approach, each firm’s decision to invest incorporates 
both the long-run profits and maintenance costs of (clean) technology.  In addition, the inclusion 
of discount rate allows us to distinguish between a forward-looking or myopic firm, while also 
                                                 
59 Emissions reduction through product innovation is certainly a topic of interest; however, it would require inclusion 
of marginal cost and would most likely further complicate any analysis. Furthermore, we would expect there to be 
spillover effects from any development, since rival firms can obtain, and therefore analyze/copy any product. For that 
reason, we leave this as a topic for future study. 
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embracing the cumulative nature of R&D and applying it to emission reducing technology. Lastly 
and most importantly, we can construct a firm’s investment strategy (over time) when faced with 
an emission tax. 
 2.2 Dynamic Game of Firms under Duopoly 
From the dynamic optimization problem in (1) for each firm, we can determine the optimal 
levels of investment by the firms. In order for our approach in a dynamic game to be useful, the 
equilibrium results need to be sub-game perfect. This means that each firm’s R&D strategy is 
optimal in every period, regardless of the values of the state variable.60 To begin, we first derive 
the firm’s current-value Hamiltonian (for brevity the time subscript is omitted) as: 
21 ( 2 ) ( )
9
i i j i i i iH a E E V E V                              (2) 
where 
i  is the costate variable associated with firm i’s per-unit emissions, thus it represents the 
marginal value of an additional unit reduction of emissions for each good produced. Since we 
assume that firm i‘s R&D does not affect firm j‘s emissions, we can omit the equation of motion 
for firm j‘s emission. 61  From equation (2), we calculate the maximum principle conditions as: 
 2i i i i
i
H
V E
V


  

             (3A) 
 ?̇? ( )ii i i
i
H
V E 


  

                          (3B) 
                                                 
60 For a discussion on open loop and feedback strategies, see Kamien and Schwartz (2012 p. 275) 
61 To show that spillover is absent, we can evaluate: 2( 2 ) / 9 ( ) ( )H a E E V E V E Vi i j i i i i j j j               . This yields 
one addition expression then those in equation (3): ?̇?
9j
H
Vj j j jE
j

   

     

.  While both firms’ emissions are 
present in equations (3a), (3b), and (3c), the co-state variable associated with firm j’s emission ( j ) and firm  j’s 
investment ( V j ) are absent. This implies that firm i’s investment decision is independent of firm j’s investment, or 
equivalently, there is no research spillover present, and the transition equations for firm j‘s emission can be omitted 
from equation (2). Of course, the effects of spillover are a topic of interest, however, we leave this for future study. 
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and the associated co-state equations: 
?̇?
4
( 2 )
9
i
i i i j i i i
i
H
a E E V
E

     

       

         (3C) 
Setting the derivative in equation (3A) to be zero, we find that the firm’s optimal investment 
(denoted by superscript “*”) is:   
 *
2
i i
i
E
V

                 (4) 
As noted by Feichtinger (1983), the absence of feedback effects ensures that the open loop solution 
is sub-game perfect. Evaluating the feedback effects using equations (2) and (4), yields: 
  
*
0 0,
ji
j i
VH
V E


   
 
 thus affirming the absence of feedback effects. With this condition 
satisfied, the open-loop Nash equilibrium is sub-game perfect.62   
 
 2.3 Dynamic R&D Optimization: Problem of a Monopoly   
Next, we evaluate how tax policy affects a firm’s investment strategy. In order to isolate 
the policy effects from those of competition, we evaluate the investment decisions of a monopoly. 
The firm’s profit function can easily be derived using the same demand equation and setting 
0.jq  Therefore the monopolist’s dynamic optimization problem is: 
,
2 2
, ,
1
max ( )  
40i t
t
i i t i t
V
a E V e dt 

 
      
       s.t.    ?̇? ,i t i,t i,t=( - V )E          (0) oE Ei           (5) 
and the associated present-value Hamiltonian is: 
 2 2
1
( 2 ) ( )
4
i i i i i iH a E V E V                              (6) 
                                                 
62 For additional information on open-loop games and the approach to prove an open-loop game is sub-game perfect 
see Cellini and Lambertini (2009). 
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From equation (6), we calculate the maximum principle conditions: 
 2i i i i
i
H
V E
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

  

             (7A) 
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                        (7B) 
and the associated co-state equation: 
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      
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          (7C) 
As before, the firm’s optimal investment (denoted by superscript “M”) is found by setting the 
derivative in equation (7A) to zero:   
 
2
M i i
i
E
V

                 (8) 
Obviously, the absence of a rival firm removes concern about feedback effects, thus we can 
disregard concerns about the results being sub-game perfect. Taking the derivative of (8) with 
respect to time, yields 
 ?̇?
2
M
iM
i
V
t

  

(𝜆𝑖𝐸𝑖̇ + 𝜆?̇?𝐸𝑖)                     (9) 
Substituting (7B), (7C), and (8) into the firm’s investment equation of motion from (9) yields the 
dynamic investment equation as a function of the state and control variables: 
 ?̇? ( )
4
iM M
i i i
E
V a E

                  (10) 
Equations (7B) and (10) constitute a complete system of a firm’s investment and emissions 
in a dynamic analysis. Plotting the movement on a phase-plane diagram yields potential investment 
strategies for emission reducing technology. 
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Figure 1 Phase-plane diagram showing optimal R&D investment path    
 
Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of how each firm’s optimal investment path 
depends on the initial emissions level, with two (non-trivial) nodes63. The horizontal axis measures 
the level of per-unit emissions and the vertical axis measures the level of R&D investment.  Two 
isoclines (emissions and investment) are drawn, which shows two points where a variable does not 
change over time. As illustrated in Figure 1, the unstable node is of little importance, since no 
optimal investment path lead to it. The stable node is a saddle-point equilibrium, which is optimally 
approached from the northeast saddle-path. This indicates that each firm invests heavily in clean 
technology initially and gradually investment tapers off.  Eventually, additional investment no 
longer will yield a large enough reduction in emissions relative to its maintenance cost, so each 
firm invests only enough to sustain the current level of technology.    
                                                 
63 A third and fourth node exist. However, they correspond to when the firm either: 1) does not invest in clean 
technology, or 2) shuts down. These are omitted for obvious reasons. 
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Setting the dynamic investment equation in (10) to zero, we determine the steady state 
relationship between investment and emissions as follows: 
 
1
( )
4
V E a Ei i i 
            (11A) 
It follows directly from (11A) that 
  
( 2 )
4
i i iV E a E 
 
 


               (11B) 
This permits us to establish the following Proposition: 
Proposition 1. Higher emission taxes decrease the steady state level of investment in clean 
technology if the following condition holds: ;
2 i
a
E
   otherwise increasing the tax rate increases 
investment. 
Proof: Examining the derivative in (11B), we see that 
0
Vi




 if ,
2 i
a
E
   and that  0
Vi




 if 
2 i
a
E
  .     Q.E.D. 
As expected, an increase in the benefits from developing clean technology encourages 
higher investment, and vice versa. This result from Proposition 1 supports the conclusions of Porter 
and Linde (1995) which state that “regulation creates pressure that motivates innovation and 
progress.” This holds true for either production with higher per-unit emissions or from higher 
emission tax rates.  While the effects of emissions tax appear to mirror previous findings from the 
static case, our objective is to show how the results will diverge over time. However, at higher tax 
rates or per unit emissions, investment can be crowded out due to the tax burden, or to state another 
way: 
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Corollary 1. As the level of emissions decline, the firm eventually reduces its level of 
investment. 
This shows that our approach already incorporates supplementary details omitted in static 
analysis. In addition, evaluating the effects of the discount rate in equation (11A), we can identify 
how a firm’s outlook/behavior affects it’s investment decision. Specifically, 
2
( )
0
4
i iV a E 
 
 
  

          (11C) 
From this, we have the following result: 
Corollary 2. Firms who are more myopic in their outlook, relative to forward looking 
firms, invest less in clean technology. 
While this result may be expected, it further illustrates the limitations of static analysis in 
the presence of cumulative effects. Furthermore, it shows that both firm behavior and profit can 
influences technological development. Identifying how environmental policy can alter the firm’s 
incentive is of obvious importance; therefore, we proceed by evaluating the properties associated 
with the emission taxes.  
 2.4 Emission Taxes  
Traditionally, the optimal tax rate is obtained by determining the social welfare maximizing 
point, where private benefits (firm revenue) equals marginal costs (firms cost and emission 
damage). The tax rate is then assigned so the firm’s profit maximizing level of production 
coincides with social welfare.  However, in the dynamic setting, the level of emissions changes 
intertemporally until it reaches the steady state.   
In Figure 2, we show different steady-state levels of emissions, which correspond to 
different tax rates.  As can easily be seen from Figure 2, the resulting steady-state level of 
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emissions depends not only on the tax rate, but also on the productivity of emissions-reduction 
investment and the maintenance costs.     
 
 
Figure 2 Effects of taxes on the steady-state equilibrium levels of emissions 
  
At first glance, one can notice that any increase in the tax rate is met with a lower steady 
state per-unit emission level.  Nevertheless, firms offset higher emissions taxes by further 
increasing investment for the development of clean technology.  As illustrated in Figure 2, the tax 
rate influences a firm’s investment strategy, and therefore its emissions. The dynamic investment 
equation from (8) provides additional policy implications, specifically: 
Corollary 3. Other things being equal, any positive tax rate on emissions ensures that a 
polluting firm has an incentive to develop clean technology.  
 The tax rate certainly affects R&D investment, thereby influencing the progress of clean 
technology development. Any corrective (Pigovian) tax instituted in the initial period (or any 
τ
δ/β
                                                                                                       E
V
2τ
3τ
    E (3 )
      E (2 )                                                    E ( )   
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period before the steady state) will only be equivalent to the negative emission externalities in that 
period. However, from an environmental standpoint, any (positive) emission tax will incentivize 
firms to reduce emissions. While the tax may not perfectly match the damage done by emissions, 
the additional cost the firm incurs encourages it to reduce the costs associated with any emissions. 
For that reason, creating the incentive to innovate and invest in clean technology could still lead 
to significant emission reductions, thus indirectly accomplishing potential emission-cutting 
objectives without being equivalent to the negative externality. But why not identify the optimal 
tax? The next section will help show the infeasibility of an optimal tax in a dynamic setting. 
 3. Steady-State Equilibrium Analyses of Three R&D Regimes  
 3.1 Optimization Problems  
In this section, we present steady state analysis for three R&D investment strategies in the 
development of clean technology: competition, merging, and cooperation.  In the R&D 
competition regime, firm i  independently determines its investment ( iV ), and both firms compete 
via the product market. This regime was constructed in Section 2.2, and the firm’s current value 
Hamiltonian is represented in equation (2).  
In the second regime, the firms merge to form a monopoly, which then chooses the total 
output and total investment. As with any monopoly, the merged entity has an incentive to decrease 
the level of production relative to the output under non-cooperative or cooperative R&D regime 
in order to obtain monopoly profit. Furthermore, with a lower level of production the merger’s 
overall tax burden is relatively lower. It is then reasonable to expect that the monopoly has the 
least incentive to invest in clean technology. The dynamic model of monopoly was also previously 
constructed in Section 2.3, and the firm’s current value Hamiltonian is provided in equation (6).  
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In the R&D cooperation regime, duopolistic firms cooperatively research and jointly 
determine their investment by agreeing and matching contributions (thus i jV V V  ).
64 Since 
firms work together, investment in clean technology development is made by both firms, and 
therefore both firms reap the rewards of the emissions-reducing technology that is developed. 
However, firm’s still compete via the product market. Therefore firm i’s dynamic optimization 
problem is: 
      2 2, ,
1
max ( 2 )  
90t
t
i i t j t t
V
a E E V e dt  

 
       
     s.t.    ?̇? , ,( 2 )i t i tV E        (0)i oE E           (12) 
and the associated present-value Hamiltonian is: 
2 21 ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 )
9
i i j i i j jH a E E V E V E V                       (13) 
Similar to the previous case, the open loop solution is sub-game perfect; however, the 
reason is distinctly different. Since the firms enter into an investment agreement, there is no 
concern about deviation from the equilibrium path, thus making the result time consistent. 
From equation (13), we calculate the maximum principle conditions: 
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         (14A) 
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               (14B) 
and the associated co-state equations:65 
                                                 
64 For a slightly different example of cooperative research, see Cellini and Lambertini (2009) and Poyago-Theotoky 
(2007). Both authors evaluate spillover in the context of innovation, and discuss when firms coordinate the level of 
research investment or form “research cartel.”  Our focus is cooperative efforts, thus the firms jointly invest in research 
to improve technology. This is synonymous to the case where spillover is perfect. 
65 Choosing the investment level ( V ) that jointly maximizes both firms’ profit, yields the following Hamiltonian: 
2 2 2(1 / 9)( 2 ) (1 / 9)( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ).iH a E E a E E V E V E Vi j j i i i j j                     Taking into account firm symmetry 
( ),E E Ei j   gives
2 2 2 2(2 / 9)( 4 ) 2 ( ),
i
H a E V E V         which yields the same level of emissions and output. 
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As before, the firm’s optimal investment (denoted by superscript “C”) is found by setting the 
derivative in equation (14A) to zero:   
 
C
i i j jV E E                             (15) 
In order to simplify the calculations, we assume that the firms are symmetrical (i.e., 
i jE E E  ). Thus far, we have constructed three different research scenarios, and validated the 
consistency of their results. The next step is a comparative analysis of each scenario. 
 3.2 Steady-State Values  
With the derived Hamiltonians for the three R&D strategies (from eqn. 2, 6, and 13), we 
first solve for the steady-state values of control variables (Vi), the state variable (Ei), and output
66 
for the R&D competition scenario (denoted with “ ”) using equations (3).  These results are 
reported as follows: 
V 

                         (16A) 
 2 21 186q a a                          (16B) 
 2 21 182E a a                          (16C) 
Using equations (7) and (14), we can derive the maximum principle conditions for the 
remaining scenarios. From this, we calculate the steady-state equilibrium values for the R&D 
                                                 
66 Note that ( 2 ) / 3i i jq a E E    t for duopolists and  ( ) / 2i iq a E   for monopolist. 
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cooperation (denoted with “C”) and merger (denoted with “M”) scenarios.  These two sets of 
results are reported, respectively, as follows: 
;                                          
2
C MV V 
 
              (17A) 
2 2 21 1( 9 );        ( 16 )
6 4
C Mq a a q a a     
 
                  (17B) 
2 2 2 21 1( 9 );     ( 16 )
2 2
C ME a a E a a
 
     
 
              (17C)  
From (16B) and (17B), we see that the tax rate is absent from the firms production level, which is 
different from the static case (see previous section for static output). The shows that the optimal 
steady-state production is independent of the emission tax rate. Note from equation (16C) that the 
discount rate and the cost of maintaining clean technology must satisfy the following constrained 
condition: 2 20 ( ) /18a   , in order for each firm to undertake R&D investment in clean 
technology in each scenario.  We assume that this condition holds, and conveniently define
  2 218 / ( )X a  . Therefore, as the temporal effects potentially vary between zero and 2 2 / 18a   
in strength, the value of X falls within the following (unit) range: 0 1.X   This normalization 
approach allows us to simplify the temporal effects, without ignoring them.67     
 4. Comparing Alternative R&D Regimes  
 Having derived the steady-state equilibrium solutions for the scenarios of R&D 
competition, cooperation, and merging, we evaluate and compare their differences in terms of 
effects on environmental damage, consumer surplus, firm profits, and social welfare.   
                                                 
67 Values of X close to zero will be associated with either a forward-looking firm and/or technology with greater 
longevity. Furthermore, values close to one will be associated with myopic firms and/or technology that wears out 
quickly. Since we are not imposing any expectation or restrictions on the type of firm or technology, this will be useful 
to determine the results for a variety of scenarios. 
78 
 
Using the steady-state values for the control and state variables, we can calculate consumer 
surplus and social welfare according to the following equations: 
21 ( )
2
i jCS q q             (18A) 
2( ) ( )i j i i j j i i j jSW CS E q E q E q E q                                        (18B) 
where   is a positive parameter which is used to represent the marginal damage of pollution to 
the environment. Note that ( )i i j jT E q E q   is the total amount of emission taxes collected and 
2( )i i j jD E q E q   is total damage to the environment. 
 It is important to recognize that the consumer surplus and social welfare equations used 
here evaluate individual time periods.  Given that our focus is on identifying the R&D strategy 
with the best steady state result this is appropriate; calculating the cumulative effects would yield 
the same result. Since values found in the steady state will hold for any future time period, any 
difference would be minimal and occur on the path to a steady-state.  
 4.1 Emissions & Environmental Damage  
 Using the equilibrium levels of emissions as shown in equations (16C) and (17C), we 
compare each clean technology investment strategy, which allows us to state the following:   
Proposition 2. Under an exogenous emissions tax policy, per-unit emissions are lowest when firms 
develop clean technology cooperatively. 
Proof: Substituting 
2 2
( ) / 18Xa   into equations (16C) and (17C), we compare emissions for 
all values of X (0 1)X   and obtain the following inequality: 
* .M CE E E      Q.E.D. 
 From the standpoint of environmental innovation, Proposition 2 indicates that cooperative 
development unambiguously results in the “cleanest” products. Normally, a monopoly is beneficial 
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in an environmental setting, specifically with conservation or resource extraction due to the limited 
production.  However, our dynamic analysis shows that although a monopoly finds it profitable to 
reduce production, it has less incentive to undertake R&D investment in clean technology.  
Therefore, determining whether lower production or greater investment will yield lower overall 
emissions is important from an environmental stand-point.  In addition, traditional environmental 
policies focus on minimizing the overall level of environmental damage needs to differentiate these 
effects.  
Note that the environmental damage portion of social welfare in equation (18B) is 
2
( ) .D E q E qi i j j   Making use of the market output and the per-unit emission in equations (16B), 
(17B), (16C), and (17C), we calculate the overall environmental damage for the three alternative 
regimes as follows: 
2 4
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X a
D

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 ;  
2 4
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C X aD


 ;  
2 4
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M X aD


                                      (19) 
The values from (19) show environmental damage is inversely related to the emission tax. This 
comes as no surprise, as the per-unit emissions tax increases, firms have a larger incentive to cut 
emissions. Comparing the values in (19) allow us to establish: 
Proposition 3. Total damage to the environment is lowest in the cooperative clean-technology, 
and highest in the competitive clean-technology investment cases. 
Proof: Comparing the values of environmental damage as shown in (19), we have
* .M CD D D                        Q.E.D. 
 If the sole purpose of the environment regulation is to diminish total emissions, competition 
in R&D investment should be discouraged.  From the perspective of environmental innovation for 
reducing emissions, competition in the development of technology leads to higher investment 
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expenditures (see equations (16A) and (17A)), but less effective clean technology. While our 
analysis assumes that the firms are symmetric, competition in the development of clean technology 
will not guarantee that the cleanest technology is utilized in a goods production. The benefit of 
cooperative or monopoly development is that it assures that any clean technology or innovation 
that is developed will be used in production of all goods.  
 4.2 Consumer Surplus  
A policy’s overall effect on a market needs to include both the costs and benefits to 
consumers and producers in order to determine its effectiveness. Substituting the steady-state 
values of outputs from (16B) and (17B) into equation (18A), we calculate consumer surplus for 
the three alternative regimes as follows: 
         
2
* 2(1 1 ) ;
18
aCS X     
2
2(1 1 ) ;
18 2
C a XCS      
2
2(3 9 8 )
288
M aCS X             (20) 
It follows from (20) that 
* .C MCS CS CS   While the merging or cooperation regime 
yields the lowest total emissions, consumers benefit the most from a cooperative R&D investment 
approach due to competition in the output market.  We can separate the benefits from a cooperative 
R&D investment strategy into two different effects: first, the efficiency of joint-development of 
clean technology or the “public good” of cleaner air, which benefits consumers and non-market 
participants as an externality (environmental damage). The second is the price effect from market 
competition for output. Thus, cooperative strategy unambiguously bestows the greatest benefits 
for consumers.  
The environmental benefits are also an important result in the context of consumers who 
may also be concerned with environmental issues such as emissions (so called “green consumers” 
Sengupta 2012) when purchasing a good (for other examples see Kurtyka and Mahenc 2011; Gori 
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and Lambertini 2013).  Since cooperation yields the highest consumer surplus and produces the 
cleanest product, this has implications for environmentally conscience consumers. Despite our 
exclusion of consumer’s preferences for “clean” products, it’s safe to assume that environmentally 
conscience consumer would unambiguous prefer the cooperative strategy. 
 4.3 Firm Profits 
Next we identify the R&D strategy would yield the highest profit for a firm. Using 
equations (16A), (16C), (17A), and (17C), we calculate firm profits for the three alternative 
regimes as follows: 
2 2
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A comparison of these values reveals that 
* M  and * .C    We thus have:  
Proposition 4. Each firm’s optimal investment strategy is dependent on the discount rate and the 
maintenance costs.  If these rates are such that the following condition is satisfied: 
   2 2 25 3 9 8 2 4 2 3 54X X X a           or   
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
16 18 54 5
9 1  4 2  ,
a a a
  
  

     
then *,C M    otherwise, *.M C     
Proof: This comes directly from equations (21), by comparing the values of X and δ.  Note that X 
is positively related to δ, and only the negation of δ enters into the firm’s profit equation. Thus, 
higher maintenance costs decreases revenue and therefore profit.                Q.E.D.  
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With higher investment costs and lower output prices, it comes as no surprise that the R&D 
competition strategy has the lowest profit for each firm.  However, the optimal strategy under 
duopolistic competition depends crucially on the nature of clean technology in an industry.  As 
shown by Proposition 3, industries with higher costs of maintaining clean technology lend itself to 
joint-development in clean technology.  This is directly related to the saving that occurs from the 
lower cost of R&D investment and maintenance.  
As the cost of maintaining clean technology decreases, eventually, the benefits of 
monopoly pricing will exceed the additional costs of investment by a single firm relative to a 
cooperative approach. This suggests that polluting firms, which operate in an industry with a low 
maintenance costs in clean technology, ceteris paribus, have an incentive to merge. 
 4.4 Social Welfare 
Using the social welfare equation in (18B), we calculate the steady-state values for the 
three alternative R&D regimes as follows: 
2 2 2 2*
18 4 2 2
(4 4 1 ) 9 2X X aSW
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Each of the social welfare equations has three distinct terms.  The first term measures the sum of 
consumer surplus, firm profits, and tax revenue and hence can be referred to as market benefits.  
The second term measures pollution damage, and the third term is investment cost. Because the 
firm’s cost of an emissions is perfectly offset by the tax revenue generated, the emission tax rate 
is absent from the market benefit expression. However, the tax rate is still present in the pollution 
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damage expression. This is appropriate since at any finite tax rate, a firm will still pollute if the 
benefits exceed the cost of production and emission tax burden.    
Looking at equations (22), we can easily rank the investment costs associated with each 
strategy, and determine that they are highest under R&D competition, but lowest under R&D 
cooperation. As previously determined, pollution damage is highest in the R&D competition 
regime, with the cooperative and monopoly setting yielding the same level of environmental 
damage. Combining these two results, we see that the combined R&D costs and pollution damage 
are unambiguously lowest in the cooperative setting.  Furthermore, the monopoly strategy has 
lower cost and pollution damage relative to the R&D competition approach.  However, this still 
omits the market benefits, and in order to identify the optimal strategy from the social welfare 
perspective, we must determine the strategy with the highest net benefit.  
As shown in figure 3 the market benefits are not consistent for all values of X.  While we 
can easily see that the cooperative R&D strategy yields the greatest market benefits for all values 
of X, we cannot identify the worst strategy. Looking at the temporal effects, we can state the 
following: 
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Figure 3 Market benefits under alternative R&D regimes 
 
Proposition 5. As the temporal effects increase due to the firm being more myopic or higher 
maintenance costs, the market benefits and social welfare unequivocally decrease.  
Proof: This follows directly from equation (22), taking derivative of the first term with respect to 
X yields negative values for any X, such that 0 1.X       Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5 shows a definite benefit for firms that are forward looking, as opposed to 
myopic. In addition, the maintenance of technology has an important role in environmental policy.  
Higher costs have a detrimental effect by reducing the market benefits through eroding the benefits 
of R&D investments. Regardless, we know that environmental damage and investment cost are 
lowest under R&D cooperation, using the results shown in figure 1, we have 
Proposition 6. Social Welfare is unambiguously the highest under the cooperative R&D strategy. 
However, the strategy that results in the lowest social welfare depends on the values of  , ,  and 
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Proof: Evaluating equation (22) for every potential value of X, we know that market benefits are 
highest in the R&D cooperative setting, which was also previously shown to have the lowest cost. 
We can therefore conclude that, among the three scenarios we consider, social welfare is highest 
with R&D cooperation.          Q.E.D. 
While we have shown that R&D cooperation is unequivocally the best strategy for 
maximizing social welfare, the worst strategy cannot unequivocally be determined. For products 
with lower (higher) maintenance costs, merger (R&D competition) strategy yields the lowest social 
benefit. However, depending on investment cost and pollution damage, social welfare of the R&D 
competition strategy may potentially be smaller, regardless of the costs of maintaining clean 
technology. The R&D competition scenario, relative to the merger, yields the largest market 
benefits, but also the largest investment costs and environmental damage. This highlights an area 
of additional research since the results may contradict Feichtinger (2014) inverted-U investment 
function, which may be due to the clear distinction in policy construction. 
One last result applies to introduction and governance of emission policies.  Obviously, if 
new emission policies tax at a high enough rate, firms may be forced to exit the market (that is,  
0iq   whenever ).ia E   However, low emission taxes create little incentive, thus an effective 
tax policy must encourage investment without pushing firms out of the market. Therefore, we can 
make one additional policy observation from equation (22) which shows that social welfare is 
monotonically increasing in .   
Proposition 7. In the presences of environmental innovation, a welfare-improving emission tax 
policy must take into account the rate of technological progress (and/or reductions in emissions). 
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Proof: Making use of equation (22), we take the limit of social welfare with respect to the tax rate 
as    and find that the total environmental damage approaches zero, thus improving overall 
welfare.68           Q.E.D. 
 This last result is important for environmental policy.  This indicates that an emission tax 
that incorporates technological progress will enhance social welfare.  Static analysis cannot 
identify the effects of a policy over time. By omitting the dynamic effects of clean technology 
innovation in the presence of an emission policy, firm investment strategies are not represented 
properly. In addition, without properly constructed environmental policies the firm incentive to 
invest corrodes over time, which is detrimental to social welfare.  
The proof of Proposition 7 also shows the futility of deriving a dynamic endogenous tax 
policy. The optimal policy would maximize social welfare in each period (one could argue the 
appropriate weights to use in each time period), which would then maximize overall welfare.  
Regardless, any such policy would fail to have a terminal point besides abating all emissions, but 
as shown in the proof above emissions would be asymptotic to zero. This result, combined with 
additional insights provided by our approach, show the failings of using an endogenous policy 
(constant or dynamic) in continuous time. 
 5. Concluding Remarks 
Our dynamic, albeit simple, design has several benefits over the traditional approach.  First, 
we are able to incorporate the cumulative nature of technology development into the firm’s 
investment decision under imperfect competition. Second, we obtain the firm’s optimal investment 
                                                 
68 Note that this is evaluating the steady-state welfare, thus as   increases each firm has made the necessary 
investment iV in order to remain profitable.  This further indicates that iE  has been sufficiently reduced by clean 
technology to satisfy 0 .ia E   
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“path.”  Finally, by identifying the dynamic investment equation, implications for environmental 
innovation and social welfare can be determined.  
The analysis in this paper yields several important results. We can determine the optimal 
strategy to produce the cleanest product, reduce overall emissions, or maximize social welfare. We 
have shown in a dynamic setting that, among the three R&D regimes we consider, social welfare 
is highest under R&D cooperation. However, firm profits may be highest in the merger case, thus 
showing an incentive to merge. This creates obvious anti-trust application. Even though the merger 
policy yields the lowest possible level of total environmental damage, both consumer surplus and 
social welfare are higher when non-merging firms cooperative in clean technology R&D. One 
obvious extension is to identify policies to encourage the firms to select the optimal strategy to 
maximize welfare. 
We have demonstrated how important dynamics is for analyzing clean technology and 
pollution abatement. With few exceptions, traditional environmental research has focused on static 
evaluations of clean technology. Frequently, the static representations show that emission taxes’ 
significantly impact both the firms’ output and investment decisions; however, our dynamic 
approach shows that the firm’s steady state cost of clean technology and output is determined 
independently of the emissions tax.  However, the emission tax still impacts the firm’s decision to 
develop clean technology and its rate of investment. 
Explicitly taking into account the temporal effects associated with R&D investment in 
clean technology, we find that the long-run impacts of environmental policies may starkly deviate 
from the immediate or short-run impacts.  We have also identified several properties for welfare-
improving emission policies in the presence of clean technology development under imperfect 
competition. Furthermore, the use of a dynamic approach highlights how a firm’s response to 
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policy may diverge from those identified in a static setting.  The differences between dynamic and 
static analyses have important policy implications for environmental innovation, tax policy, and 
social welfare. The application of dynamic optimization in environmental policy is an interesting 
topic requiring additional research. 
 
 
 
89 
 
References  
Abernathy, W. and Utterback, J. (1978), “Patterns of industrial innovation,” Technology Review, 
vol. 14, 3-22. 
 
Aghion, P.; Bloom, N.; Blundell, R.; Griffith, R.; Howitt, P. (2005), “Competition and innovation: 
An inverted-U relationship,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 701-728. 
 
Akamai Technoligies, Inc. (2014), Akamai’s State of the Internet, 7 (1). Retrieved from: 
http://www.akamai.com/dl/akamai/akamai-soti-q114.pdf?WT.mc_id=soti_Q114 
 
Amacher, G.S.; Koskela, E.; Ollikainen, M. (2004). Environmental quality competition and eco-
labeling, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47, 284–306. 
 
Arrow, K. (1962), “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention,” Richard 
Nelson, ed., The Rate of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Baksi S. and P. Bose (2006). Credence goods, efficient labelling policies, and regulatory 
enforcement.  Environmental and Resource Economics 37, 411-430 
 
Bandyopadhyay, S. and Acharyya, R. (2004), “Process and product innovation: complementary in 
a vertically differentiated monopoly with discrete consumer types,” The Japanese 
Economic Review, 55, 175-200. 
 
Baron, D. (2011). Credence attributes, voluntary organizations, and social pressure. Journal of 
Public Economics, 95, 1331-1338. 
 
Baumol, W. The Free-Market Innovation Machine. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Print. 
 
Bayus, B. (1995), “Optimal dynamic policies for product and process innovation,” Journal of 
Operations Management, 12, 173-185. 
 
Beladi, H.; Liu, L.; Oladi, R. (2013), “On pollution permits and abatement,” Economics Letters, 
119, 302-305. 
 
Belleflamme, P. and Vergari, C. (2006), “Incentives to innovate in oligopolies” The Manchester 
School, 79, 6-28. 
 
Ben Youssef, A. and Lahmandi-Ayed, R. (2008). Eco-labelling, competition and environment: 
Endogenization of labelling criteria. Environmental and Resource Economics 41, 133-154. 
 
Bergin, J. and Bernhardt, D. (2009), “Cooperation through imitation,” Games and Economic 
Behavior, 67, 376-388. 
 
90 
 
Berry, S. and Waldfogel, J. (2010), “Product quality and market size,” The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 58, 1-31. 
 
Bonanno, G. and Haworth, B. (1998), “Intensity of competition and the choice between product 
and process innovation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 495-510. 
 
Buchanan, J. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs, Economica, 32, 1-14. 
 
Canton, J.; Soubeyran, A.; and Stahn, H. (2008), “Environmental taxation and vertical Cournot 
oligopolies: How eco-industries matter,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 40, 
369-382. 
 
Cellini, R. and Lambertini, L. (2009), “Dynamics R&D with spillovers: Competition vs. 
cooperation,” Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 33, 568-582. 
 
Cellini, R. and Lambertini, L. (2011), “R&D incentives under Bertrand competition: A differential 
game,”The Japanese Economic Review, 62, 387-400. 
 
Chen, Y. and Schwartz, M. (2013), “Product innovation incentives: monopoly vs. competition,” 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 22, 513-528. 
 
Conrad, K., (2005). Price competition and product differentiation when consumers care for the 
environment, Environmental and Resource Economics 31, 1–19. 
 
Doni, N. and Ricchiuti, G. (2013). Market equilibrium in the presence of green consumers and 
responsible firms: A comparative static analysis, Resource and Energy Economics, 35, 
380-395. 
 
Dossey, L. (2010). Natural Marketing Institute: LOHAS market size. LOHAS Journal, 28-29. 
 
Dosi, C. and Moretto, M. (2001). Is eco-labeling a reliable environmental policy measure? 
Environmental and Resource Economics 18, 113-127. 
 
Duffy, J. and Ochs, J. (2009), “Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction,” 
Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 785-812. 
 
EPA, (2014 February 12). Partnership Programs: List of Programs. Retrieved from 
http://www.epa.gov/partners/programs/index.htm 
 
Feichtinger, G., (1983). “The Nash solution of an advertising differential game: generalization of 
a model by Leitmann and Schmitendorf. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 28, 
1044-1048. 
 
Feichtinger, G; Lambertini, L.; Leitmann, G.; and Wrzaczek, S. (2014), “R&D for green 
technologies in a dynamic oligopoly: Schumpeter, Arrow and inverted-U’s,” (Working 
91 
 
Paper No. 929) Retrieved from Social Science Research Network website: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2406874    
 
Fiat, A.; Koutsoupias, E.; Ligett, K.; Mansour, Y. (2013), “Beyond myopic best response (in 
Cournot competition)” Games and Economic Behavior, in press, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.006 
 
Finley, K. (2013), “Google fiber scares old-school net providers into action,” Wired. Retrieved 
from: http://www.wired.com/2013/04/google-fiber-verizon/ 
  
Fishcer, C. and Lyon, T. (2014). Competing Environmental Labels, Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 23, 692-716. 
 
Fung, B. (2014), “ISPs are spending less onthir networks as they make more money off them,” 
The Washington Post. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/07/24/isps-are-spending-less-on-their-networks-as-they-make-more-
money-off-them/ 
 
Gans, J. and Stern, S. (2004), “Incumbency and R&D incentives: licensing the gale of creative 
destruction,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9, 485-511. 
 
Garcia-Gallego, A. and Georgantzis, N. (2009). Market effects of changes in consumers’ social 
responsibility, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 18, 235–262. 
 
Gil-Molto, M. and Varvarigos, D. (2013), “Emission taxes and the adoption of cleaner 
technologies: The case of environmentally conscious consumers,” Resource and Energy 
Economics, 35, 486-504.   
 
Gori, G. and Lambertini, L. (2013), “Trade liberalization between asymmetric countries with 
environmentally concerned consumers,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 43, 549-
560. 
 
Greaker, M. and Rosendahl, K. (2008), “Environmental policy with upstream pollution 
abatement,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 56, 246-259. 
 
Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; Mzoughi, N. (2007). Industrialists hand in hand with environmentalists: 
how eco-labeling schemes can help firms to raise rivals’ costs, European Journal of Law 
and Economics, 24, 215–236. 
 
Gustin, S. (2012), “Google fiber issues public challenge: get up to speed!” Time. Retrieved from: 
http://business.time.com/2012/09/14/with-google-fiber-search-giant-issues-public-
challenge-get-up-to-speed/ 
  
Hamilton, S. and Zilberman, D. (2006). Green markets eco-certification and equilibrium fraud, 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 52, 627–644. 
 
92 
 
Heyes, A. and Maxwell, J. (2004). Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the 
international environment, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48, 
 
Heyes, A and Kapur, S. (2001), “Regulatory attitudes and environmental innovation in a model 
combining internal and external R&D,” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 61, 327-340.   
 
Holmstrom, B. (1989), “Agency costs and innovation,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 12, 305-327. 
 
Ibanez, L. and Grolleau, G. (2008). Can ecolabeling schemes preserve the environment?, 
Environmental and Resource Economics 40: 233-249. 
 
Iida, T. and Takeuchi, K. (2011), “Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?” 
Journal of Economics, 104, 159-190. 
 
Jaffe, A.; Newell, R..; Stavins, R. (2002), “Environmental policy and technological change,” 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 22, 41-69. 
 
Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N. (2012). Dynamic Optimization: the calculus of variations and 
optimal control in economics and management. 2nd edition. Dover Publications, NY.   
 
Kim, S.; Park, C.; Lee, S. (2012), “Environmental tax and licensing a patent for clean technology 
management,” Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 57, 95-101. 
 
Kurtyka, O. and Mahenc, P. (2011), “The switching effect of environmental taxation within 
Bertrand differentiated duopoly,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
62, 267-277. 
 
Lambertini, L. and Mantovani, A. (2009), “Process and product innovation by a multiproduct 
monopolist: A dynamic approach,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27, 
508-518. 
 
Lambertini, L. and Mantovani, A. (2010), “Process and product innovation: A differential game 
approach to product life cycle,” International Journal of Economic Theory, 6, 227-252. 
 
Lombardini-Riipinen, C. (2005). Optimal tax policy environmental quality competition, 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 32, 317-336. 
 
Malueg, D. and Tsutsui, S. (1997), “Dynamic R&D competition with learning,” The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 28, 751-772. 
 
Mason, C. (2006). An economic model of eco-labeling, Environmental Modeling and Assessment 
11: 131-143. 
 
93 
 
Mason, C. (2011). Eco-labeling and market equilibria with noisy certification tests, Environmental 
and Resource Economics, 48, 537–560. 
 
Mattoo , A. and H.V. Singh, (1994). Eco-labelling: policy considerations, Kyklos, 47, 53–65. 
 
Michels, S. (2008, August 15). Environmental Demand Drives Eco-Friendly Products. Retrieved 
from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/topic/science/ 
 
Moraga-Gonzalez, J. and Padron-Fumero, N. (2002). Environmental policy, Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 22, 419-447.  
 
Nocke, V. (2007), “Collusion and dynamic (under-) investment in quality,” RAND Journal of 
Economics, 38, 227-249. 
 
Ouardighi, F.; Shnaiderman, M.; Pasin, F. (2014), “Research and development with stock-
dependent spillovers and price competition in a duopoly,” Journal of Optimization Theory 
and Applications, 161, issue 2, 626-647. 
 
Porter, M. and van der LInde, C. (1995), “Towards a new conception of the environment-
competitiveness relationship,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 97-118. 
 
Potoski, M. and Prakash, A. (2005). Green clubs and voluntary governance: ISO 14001 and firm’s 
regulatory compliance, American Journal of Political Science, 49, 235-248. 
 
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2007), “The organization of R&D and environmental policy,” Journal of 
Economics Behavior and Organization, 62, 63-75. 
 
Requate, T. (2005), “Timing and commitment of environmental policy, adoption of new 
technology, and repercussions of R&D,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 31, 
175-199. 
 
Saha, S. (2014), “Firm’s objective function and product and process R&D,” Economic Modeling, 
36, 484-494. 
 
Schumpeter, J. (1934), The Theory of Economic Development, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Segerson, K. and T. Miceli, (1998). Voluntary environmental agreements: good or bad news for 
environmental protection? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36, 
109–130. 
 
Sengupta, A. (2012), “Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with 
green consumer,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 64, 468-480. 
 
Stein, J. (1989), “Efficient capital capital markets, inefficient firms: a model of myopic corporate 
behavior,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 655-669.  
 
94 
 
Teece, D. (1992), “Competition, cooperation, and innovation organizational arrangements for 
regimes of rapid technological progress,” Journal of Economics Behavior and 
Organization, 18, 1-25. 
 
Teisl, M.; Roe, B.; Hicks, R. (2002). Can eco-labels tune a market? Evidence from dolphin-safe 
labeling, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43, 339-359. 
 
“The Swedish Tax on Nitrogen Oxide Emissions: Lessons in Environmental Policy Reforms,” 
OECD Environmental Policy Paper No.2, December 2013. Retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/  
 
Ulph, A. and Ulph, D. (2007), “Climate change-environmental and technological policies in a 
strategic context,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 37, 159-180.  
 
Utterback, J. and Abernathy, W. (1975), “A dynamic model of process and product innovation” 
OMEGA, 3, 639-656. 
 
van’t Veld, K., and Kotchen, M. (2011). Green clubs, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 62, 309-322. 
 
Walter, J. and Chang, Y. (2014), “R&D Investment in Clean Technology: Compete, Cooperate, or 
Merge?” WEAI Conference, Grand Hyatt, Denver, CO. 1 July 2014.  
 
“We have a winner” The Economist 21 July 2011. Retrieved from The Economist website: 
http://www.economist.com/node/18989175  
 
“When did the Federal Government begin collecting the gas tax” Highway History Updated: 
October 2013. Retrieved from Federal Highway Administration website on May 2014 
from: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/gastax.cfm 
 
 
 
95 
 
Appendix A - Proof of Proposition 1 
Using the assumption that 24c  , we can evaluate the stability of the dynamic system 
created by equations (8B) and  (9). This yields the following Jacobian matrix: 
            21 44
                                 
V V
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Solving for the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix yields: 
   2 2 2 21 1 1 4 4 4 ,1 2 2
M
c       
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   2 2 2 21 1 1 4 4 42 2 2
M
c       
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       
With the restriction on ϴ2, we can verify that λ1M > 0 and  λ2M < 0, thus indicating that the system 
reaches steady state corresponding to a saddle point. 
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Appendix B - Comparative Dynamics (Monopoly) 
Taking the derivative of the monopolist’s steady state values (note that 24c  ), yields: 
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Taking the derivative of the monopolist’s steady state values w.r.t. initial product appeal 
(and again, noting that 24c  ), yields: 
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Appendix C - Proof of Proposition 3 
As before, we can evaluate the stability of the dynamic system created by equations 
(20B) and  (23). This yields the following Jacobian matrix: 
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Solving for the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix yields: 
  * 2 2 21 1 1 4 4 4 ,1 2 2 c           
  * 2 2 21 1 1 4 4 4 ,2 2 2 c           
As before, it is easy to verify that λ1* > 0 and  λ2* < 0, thus indicating that the system reaches 
steady state corresponding to a saddle point. 
 
98 
 
Appendix D - Comparative Dynamics (Duopoly) 
Taking the derivative of the duopolists’ steady state values, yields: 
*
1 0
Pi


 

    
*
1
0
2
i


 

  * 5 0
8
CS

  

  * 3 0
8
TS

  

 
Taking the derivative of the duopolists’s steady state values w.r.t. initial product appeal 
yields:  * 1 0
2
CS
Ao
  

   * 1 0
2
TS
Ao
  

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Appendix E - Comparison of Product Appeal  
In order to prove that monopolists innovation will always exceed a duopolists, we assume 
that MA A  , this means: 
 
22
2 2 2 26 6 4 4 4
Ao
c c

           
 

    
 
Rewritten, this yields a condition on product differentiation:     
  2
2 2 3
24
Ao
c
 

      
 
 
 
 
Next, we identify the necessary condition for the duopolist to fully-serve the market 
(otherwise both firms act like monopolists).To fully sever the market, the utility from both 
products must be greater than zero for indifferent user (this is where x=1/2), thus: 
1
0
2
A A Po i i 
 
 
 
     or with steady state values: 
 9
2 2 2
2 3
Ao
c
 

      
 
 
 
 
Substituting the maximum value for product differentiation into the condition for greater 
duopoly innovation, yields: 
   
2 2 2 22 3
2 3 2 29 4
A Ao o
c c
   
                
   
  
   
 
Which clearly cannot happen, therefore we can conclude that monopolist will always 
exceed duopolist level of innovation. 
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Appendix F - Welfare Calculations 
 Consumer surplus 
Given the preferences of heterogeneous consumers as specified in (1), we have  
1
0
[ (1 ) ( )] ( )
x
e
x
CS v x P P dx v P dx             
Note that   is the external benefit to the society from the green product’s environmental 
friendliness or abatement, where n   and n is the equilibrium quantity of the green product sold in 
the market.  We then have 
1
0
[ (1 ) ( )] ( )
x
e
x
CS v x n P P dx v n P dx             
which is re-written as  
 
1
0 0
2
1
0
0
[(1 ) ] ( ) ( )
       =
2
(2 )
      ( )
2
x x
e
x
x
e
e
CS x P dx v n P dx v n P dx
x
x P x vx nx Px
x x
P x v n P
  

 


        
 
     
 
 
     
 
  
 
Competitive market for the non-green product implies that the equilibrium price for the good is 
equal to its price, that is, .P v  In addition, the equilibrium quantity of the green product sold ( n ) is 
equal to the number of green consumers ( x ). It follows that    
(2 )
2
e
x x
CS n P x



   , 
where n is public benefit from the green product, [ (2 )] 2x x   is private benefit to green 
consumers, and 
eP x  is the amount of premium to green firms.   
 
 Producer surplus 
Given the profit functions of green and non-green firms as specified in (3), we have  
1
2
0
( ) ( )
y
e
y
PS P P y ky c y dy P c yk dy            
which is re-written as   
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1
2
0 0
1
2 2 2 2
0 0
2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
      = ( )
2 2 2
( )
      = ( )
2 2
y
e
y
e
e
PS P y y dy ky dy P c
y y ky
P P c
y k
P y P c k
 
 
 
      
   
        
   

    
 
 
Competitive market for the green product implies that the equilibrium price for the good is equal 
to the cost of production for the marginal firm, that is, .P c k  We thus have  
2 2( )
.
2 2
e
k y
PS P y
 
     
where 2k  is Ricardian rent, eP y  is green price premium, and 
2 2( ) 2y   is green cost. 
 
 
